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Abstract 
In the traditional contract law doctrines of both civil- and common law the liability of the 
party who breaches a contract is limited to paying compensatory damages for the injured 
party’s provable loss. According to the doctrine of disgorgement, however, the function 
is to strip the profits that were made through the breach.  
This thesis introduces and analyzes the so-called disgorgement remedy within contract 
law and specifically under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG). Closely related issues include the application and influence 
of the principle of good faith within the CISG and the principle of full compensation, 
which might preclude the applicability of disgorgement under the CISG.  
The doctrine of disgorgement was not discussed at the time of drafting the CISG and 
therefore the question must be resolved instead through interpretation. More specifically, 
by virtue of the CISG’s interpretation doctrine, the interpretation shall be conducted with 
the help of the general principles underlying the Convention. Therefore, the principles 
such as good faith and full compensation and their appropriate interpretation are highly 
relevant to this thesis. 
In order to understand the remedy and its possible operability within the CISG, this thesis 
provides background information about disgorgement by way of introducing different 
theories and viewpoints through which this remedy has been evaluated, namely theories 
of efficient breach and corrective justice. 
As a comparative viewpoint, this thesis analyzes some of the recent developments within 
common law, where there has been an observable drift towards accepting disgorgement 
in certain limited sets of circumstances. In particular, the most articulated acceptance of 
the remedy in the form of Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment of 
the U.S. will receive considerable attention.  
This thesis concludes that the interpretative analysis regarding this issue as well as the 
issue of good faith under the CISG need to be discussed and should preferably be also 
addressed by the CISG Advisory Council. Should disgorgement become feasible under 
the CISG, it is the writer’s contention that this would require further interpretation of Art. 
84 CISG and recognition of this article as an embodiment of a general a general principle 
lending support for disgorgement.  
Subjects and Topics 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)  
Contract damages 
Disgorgement of profit  





Index of Authorities ........................................................................................................ IV	
Statutes and Official Material ..................................................................................... IV	
Court Cases and Arbitral Awards ............................................................................... IV	
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ V	
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ XV	
Disgorgement and the CISG – Comparative and Future Perspectives ............................. 1	
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1	
1.1 Overview of the Subject Matter and Approach ...................................................... 1	
1.2 The CISG ................................................................................................................ 4	
1.3 Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................ 5	
2. What is Disgorgement? ................................................................................................. 7	
2.1 Terminology ............................................................................................................ 7	
2.2 Traditional Contract Law Approach ..................................................................... 11	
3. The Disgorgement Debate .......................................................................................... 15	
3.1 The Origins of Disgorgement ............................................................................... 15	
3.1.1 Disgorgement Outside Contract Law ............................................................. 16	
3.1.2 Disgorgement’s Advancement into Contract Law – Introduction to the Blake 
v. Attorney General and the Adras v. Harlow Jones ............................................... 19	
3.2 Efficient Breach Theory and Disgorgement ......................................................... 20	
3.2.1 Efficient Breach as a Counter-argument for Disgorgement .......................... 21	
3.2.2 The Reception and Critique of the Theory .................................................... 23	
3.3 Corrective Justice and Disgorgement ................................................................... 27	
4. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ................................ 32	
4.1 The Restatements of Law: A Brief Overview ....................................................... 32	
4.2 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ................................. 33	
4.3 Disgorgement as Prescribed in the R3RUE .......................................................... 36	
4.4 Reception in Legal Literature ............................................................................... 40	
4.5 Critique Towards § 39 R3RUE ............................................................................. 41	
4.6 Summary of the R3RUE’s Disgorgement and Its Context ................................... 43	
5. Relevant Remedial Provisions of the CISG ................................................................ 44	
5.1 Article 74 CISG – the General Damages Provision .............................................. 44	
5.2 Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Article 74 ..................................................... 46	
5.3 Article 84 as a Possible Basis for Granting Disgorgement ................................... 48	
6. Interpretation of the CISG Regarding Disgorgement ................................................. 52	
6.1 Article 7 CISG ...................................................................................................... 52	
III 
 
6.2 Gap-filling Under the CISG .................................................................................. 54	
6.3 Analogous Application ......................................................................................... 55	
6.4 General Principles in Gap-filling and Interpretation ............................................ 56	
7. General Principles of the CISG and Disgorgement .................................................... 59	
7.1 What General Principles the CISG Entails? ......................................................... 59	
7.2 The Principle of Good Faith ................................................................................. 61	
7.2.1 History and Content of Good Faith Under the CISG ..................................... 61	
7.2.2 The Divide Between Civil- and Common Law Perceptions of Good Faith .. 64	
7.2.3 More Tangible Derivatives of Good Faith Principle ..................................... 66	
7.2.4 The Principle of Good Faith and Disgorgement ............................................ 67	
7.3 The Principle of Full Compensation ..................................................................... 68	
7.4 Uniformity of Application .................................................................................... 71	

















Index of Authorities 
 
Statutes and Official Material 
 
American Law Institute (website). Accessed September 2017. (at: 
https://www.ali.org/about-ali/.) 
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted and Promulgated by the Se-
cond Session of the Ninth National People's Congress March 15, 1999). 
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, The Hague, 1 
July 1964, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 834. 
Dutch Civil Code. Available at: http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodegeneral.htm. 
Principles of European Contract Law. Available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/textef.html. 
Restatement (First) of Restitution 1937. American Law Institute. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 1979. American Law Institute. 
Restatement (Third) of Resitution and Unjust Enrichment 2011. American Law Institute. 
Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 (CISG) Draft (Draft counterpart: Art. 70). Available 
at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-74.html. 
UNIDROIT Principles 2010. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. 
Uniform Commercial Code of United States. 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna 
1980. 
 
Court Cases and Arbitral Awards 
 
AB Corp. v. CD Co. (The Sine Nomine), [2002] 1 LLOYD’S REP. 805. 
Adras Construction Co. Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones (ISR, 1988). 
Attorney General v. Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. 2001. (House of Lords). 
Austria. Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) (18 December 2002). Available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021218a3.html. 
Austria. Vienna Arbitration proceeding SCH-4318 (15 June 1994). Available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a4.html. 
British Motor Trade Ass’n v. Gilbert, [1951] 2 All E.R. 641. 
Columbia. Constitutional Court of Columbia (10 May 2000). 
Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 935 (Wyo. 2000).  
V 
 
Earth Info, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1995). 
Finland. Helsinki Court of Appeals (26 October 2000). Available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001026f5.html. 
Foss v. Heineman, 128 N.W. 881, 885 (Wis. 1910) . 
France. (BRI Production "Bonaventure" v. Pan African Export) (Available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950222f1.html) (Appellate Court Grenoble, 22 
February 1995.). 
Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 108, 114 (2003). 
Germany. OLG München (14 January 2009). 
Hickey & Co., Ltd. v. Roches Stores (Dublin) Ltd., [1993] H. Ct. (1976) (Ir.). 
Halifax Bldg. Soc'y v. Thomas, [1995] 4 All E.R. 673 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
Hungary. Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Budapest (17 
November 1995). Available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951117h1.html. 
Keneric Tractor Sales Ltd. v. Langille, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 440 (Can.). 
Poland. Supreme Court (11 May  2007). 
Renard Constructions (ME) PTY LTD v. Minister for Public Works, 26 New South Wales 
Law Reports 234. 1992. 
Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 365 (Exch.). 
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
Spain. Apellate Court Navarra (27 December 2007) Available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071227s4.html. 
Sweden. 'Pressure sensors case' (Available at: 
http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/1521.pdf) (Stochholm 
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 5 April 2007). 
Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1233 (D. Colo. 
2001). 
Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co., [1911] A.C. 301 (P.C. 1910) (Eng.). 




Andersen, Camilla Baasch. 2008. "General Principles of the CISG – Generally 
Impenetrable?" In Sharing International Commercial Law Across National 
Boundaries: Festchrift for Albert H. Kritzer on the Occasion of his Eightieth 
Birthday, edited by Camilla B. and Schroeter, Ulrich G. (eds.) Anderson, 13-33. 
London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing. 
VI 
 
Andersen, Eric G. 1988. "Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts." 73 Iowa Law 
Review 299.  
Anderson, Roy Ryden. 2015. "The Compensatory Disgorgement Alternative to 
Restatement Third’s New Remedy for Breach of Contract." Southern Methodist 
University Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 4.  
Aristotle. 1985. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by with Introduction, by Terence Irwin 
Translated. Hackett. 
Atamer, Yesim M. 2013. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 14, ‘Interest under Arti-
cle 78 CISG’, Rapporteur: Professor Doctor Yesim M. Atamer, Istanbul Bilgi 
University, Turkey. Adopted unanimously by the CISG Advisory Council fol-
lowing its 18th meeting, in Beijing, China on 21 and 22 October 2013 
Barnett, Katy. 2012. Accounting for profit for breach of contract, Theory and Practice. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Birks, Peter. 1985. An Introduction to the Law of Restitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Birks, Peter. 1987. "Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the 
Fusion of Law and Equity." LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 421.  
Birmingham, Robert L. 1970. "Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency." 24 Rutgers Law Review 273.  
Boele-Woelki, Katharina. 2001. "Terms of Co-Existence: The CISG and the UNIDROIT 
Principles." In The International Sale of Goods Revisited, edited by Peter and 
Volken, Paul (eds.) Šarčević, 203-241. New York: Kluwer Law International. 
Bonell, Michael Joachim. 2005. An international Restatement of Contract Law, The 
Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Third edition 
incorporating the Unidroit Principles 2004. New York: Transnational Publishers. 
Bonell, Michael Joachim. 1987. "Article 7." In Commentary on the International Sales 
Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, by C.M. Bianca and M.J. Bonell, edited 
by C.M. Bianca and M.J. Bonell (eds.), 65-94. Giuffrè Milan. 
Botterell, Andrew. 2010. "Contractual Performance, corrective justice, and disgorgement 
for breach of contract." Legal Theory 16 (3): 135-160. 
Brandner, Gert. 1999. "Admissibility of Analogy in Gap-filling under the CISG." Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law (available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/brandner.html).  
Bridge, Michael G. 2013. The International Sale of Goods. 3rd ed. Oxford University 
Press. 
Bridge, Michael. 2008. CISG Advisory Opinion No. 9, ‘Consequences of Avoidance of 
the Contract’, Rapporteur: Professor Michael Bridge, London School of Eco-
nomics, London, United Kingdom. Adopted by the CISG-AC following its 12th 
meeting in Tokyo, Japan on 15 November 2008 
Bridgeman, Curtis. 2007. "Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract 
Law." 75 Fordham Law Review, 3013.  
VII 
 
Brooks, Richard. 2006. "The Efficient Performance Hypothesis." Faculty Scholarship 
Series. Paper 1698.  
Burrows, A.S. 2004. Remedies for Tort and Breach of Contract. 3d ed. Oxford University 
Press. 
Burrows, Andrew. 1993. "No Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract." LLOYD'S 
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 453.  
Burrows, Andrew S. 2002. The Law of Restitution. 2nd ed. London: Butterworths. 
Campbell, D., and D. Harris. 2002. "In Defence of Breach: A Critique of Restitution and 
the Performance Interest 22 Legal Studies 208." 22 Legal Studies 208.  
Campbell, David. 2011. "A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution § 
39." 68 Washington & Lee Law Review (Available at: 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol68/iss3/11.) 1063. 
Cooter, Robert, and Bradley J. Freedman. 1991. "The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences." 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045.  
Cunnington, Ralph. 2008. "The Inadequacy of Damages as a Remedy for Breach of 
Contract ." In Justifying Private Law Remedies, edited by Charles EF Rickett 
(eds.). Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Dagan, Hanoch. 2000. "Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in 
Private Law Theory." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1: 115-154. 
DeLong, Sidney. 1989. "The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of 
Contract." 22 IND. Law Review 737.  
DiMatteo, Larry A. and Dhooge, Lucien J. and Maurer, Virginia G. and Pagnattaro Marisa 
Anne and Greene, Stephanie M. 2004. "The Interpretive Turn in International 
Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence ." Northwestern 
Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 24 (Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1491342) 299-440. 
DiMatteo, Larry A. 1997. "The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended 
Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings." 22 Yale Journal of 
International Law 111.  
Dobbs, Dan B. 1993. Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution. 2nd ed. 
Dodge, William S. 1999. "The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts." 48 Duke Law 
Journal 629.  
Edelman, James. 2002. Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual 
Property. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Edelman, James. 2000. "Restitutionary damages and disgorgement for breach of 
contract." Restitution Law Review 129.  
Eiselen, Sieg. 2014. "The CISG as Bridge between Common Law and Civil Law." In 
International Sales Law: A Global Challenge, edited by DiMatteo Larry A. (Eds.), 
612-629. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
VIII 
 
Eisenberg, Melvin A. 2006. "The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law." 105 Michigan 
Law Review 559 (Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/27). 
Enderlein, Fritz, and Dietrich Maskow. 1992. nternational Sales Law: United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods . Oceana 
Publications. 
Farnsworth, E. Allan. n.d. "Damages and Specific Relief." 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 249 (1979). 
Farnsworth, E. Allan. 1985. "Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of Disgorgement 
Principle in Breach of Contract." 94 Yale Law Journal 1339. 
Feldman, Steven W. 2013. "Rescission, Restitution, and the Principle of Fair Redress: A 
Response to Professors Brooks and Stremitzer." Valparaiso University Law 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 2.  
Felemegas, John. 2007. "Introduction." In An International Approach to the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as 
Uniform Sales Law, edited by (eds) Dr. John Felemegas. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Felemegas, John. 2001. "The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation." Pace Review 
of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
(Available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/felemegas.html).  
Ferrari, Franco. 2003. "Gap-Filling and Interpretation of the CISG: Overview of 
International Case Law." Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law & 
Arbitration, vol. 7 (Available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ferrari11.html) 63-92. 
Ferrari, Franco. 2008. "Have the Dragons of Uniform Sales Law Been Tamed? 
Ruminations on the CISG’s Autonomous Interpretation by Courts." In Sharing 
International Commercial Law across National Boundaries: Festschrift for 
Albert H. Kritzer on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday, edited by Schroeter 
Ulrich G. (Eds.) Andersen Camilla B., 134- 167. London. 
Ferrari, Franco. 2009. "Homeward Trend: What, Why and Why Not." In CISG 
Methodology, edited by Meyer Olaf (eds.) Janssen André, 171-207. Munich: 
Sellier European Law Publishers. 
Ferrari, Franco. 1994-95. "Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law." 24 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (Available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/franco.html). 
Flechtner, Harry M., and Joseph M. Lookofsky. 2005. "Nominating Manfred Forberich: 
The Worst CISG Decision in 25 Years." Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Arbitration, vol. 9, no. 1 (Available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky13.html) 199-208. 
Fountoulakis, Christiana. 2010. "Section I. Effects of avoidance. Arts. 81–84." In 
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
IX 
 
by Schlechtriem Peter and Schwenzer Ingeborg, edited by Schlechtriem Peter and 
Schwenzer Ingeborg (Eds.). Oxford. 
Frank, John P. 1998. "The American Law Institute, 1923-1998." Hofstra Law Review: 
Vol. 26: Issue 3, Article 4.  
Friedmann, Daniel. 1989. "The efficient breach fallacy ." 18 Journal of Legal Studies 1.  
Garro, Alejandro M. 1989. "Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." 23 International Lawyer 443-
483. 
Garro, Alejandro M. 1995. "The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in 
International Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between the Principles 
and the CISG." Tulane Law Review Vol. 69 (Available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/alejandro_miguel_garro/39/).  
Giglio, Francesco. 2007. "Restitution for Wrongs: A Structural Analysis." 5 The 
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 4-34. 
Gotanda, John Y. (Rapporteur). n.d. "CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6 Calculation 
of Damages under Article 74 CISG." 
Gotanda, John Y. Fall 2005. "Awarding Damages under the United Nations Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods: A Matter of Interpretation." 37 Georgetown 
Journal of International Law 95-140. 
Gotanda, John Y. 2004. "Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis." 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. p. 391.  
Gotanda, John Y. 2006. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, ‘Calculation of Damages 
under Article 74 CISG’, Rapporteur: Professor John Y. Gotanda. Adopted by the 
CISG Advisory Council at its Spring 2006 meeting in Stockholm, Sweden 
Hachem, Pascal. 2012. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 10, ‘Agreed Sums Payable 
upon Breach of an Obligation in CISG Contracts’, Rapporteur: Dr. Pascal 
Hachem, Bär & Karrer AG, Zurich, Switzerland. Adopted by the CISG-AC fol-
lowing its 16th meeting in Wellington, New Zealand on 3 August 2012 
 
Hellner, Jan. 1990. "Gap-filling by analogy. Art. 7 of the U.N. Sales Convention in Its 
Historical Context." Studies in International Law: Festskrift til Lars Hjerner 
(Available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/hellner.html).  
Hillman, Robert A. 1995. "Applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the  International Sale of Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity." Cornell 
Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(Available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hillman1.html) 21-49. 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell. 1897. "The Path of the Law." Harvard Law Review (10): 457. 
Hondius, Ewoud, and André Janssen. 2015. "Chapter 26. Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-
Based Remedies throughout the World." In Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based 
Remedies throughout the World, by Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen, edited 
X 
 
by Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen. Switzerland: Springer International 
Publishing. 
Honnold, John. 1989. Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales: 
The Studies, Deliberations and Decisions That Led to the 1980 United Nations 
Convention with Introductions and Explanations. Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers. 
Honnold, John O. 2009. Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United 
Nations Convention. 4th Edition. Edited by eds Harry M. Flechtner. Kluwer 
Arbitration. 
Huber, Peter, and Alastair Mullis. 2007. The CISG: A new textbook for students and 
practitioners. European Law Publishers. 
Israel, Ronald, and Brian O’Neill. 2014. "Disgorgement as a viable theory of restitution 
damages." Commercial Damages Reporter, Issue: January (Available at: 
http://www.csglaw.com/B8D11B/assets/files/News/israel_oneill__commercial_
damages_reporter_jan_2014_lead_article.pdf) 3-9 . 
Janssen, André, and Sörren Clas Kiene. 2009. "The CISG and Its General Principles." In 
CISG Methodology, by Andre Janssen and Olaf Meyer, edited by Janssen A and 
Meyer O (eds), 261 –286. Sellier European Law Publishers. 
Kastely, Amy H. 1988. "Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United 
Nations Sales Convention." 8 Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business 574 (Available at: 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=124
1&context=njilb).  
Kazimierska, Anna. 1999-2000. "The Remedy of Avoidance under the Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods." Pace Review of the Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kazimierska.html) (Kluwer) 79-192. 
Koneru, Phanesh. 1997. "The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An approach based on General 
Principles." 6 Minn. J. Global Trade 105 (Available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koneru.html). 
Kull, Andrew. 2006. "Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment." 82 A.L.I. PROC. 249.  
Kull, Andrew. 2001. "Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,” and the 
Restatement of Contracts’, 79 TEX. L. REV. (2001), ." 79 Texas Law Review.  
Kull, Andrew. 2011. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. 
Restatement of Law, St Paul: American Law Institute. 
Laycock, Douglas. 2012. "Restoring the Restitution to the Canon." Michigan Law Review 
[Vol. 110:929].  
Lookofsky, Joseph. 2000. "The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts or the 
International Sales of Goods." Edited by R. Blanpain J. Herbots. International 
XI 
 
Encyclopedia of Laws: Contracts (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, 
1-192, at 18. (Kluwer Law International ) 1-192. 
Macneil, Ian R. 1982. "Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky." 68 VA. Law 
Review 947.  
Magnus, Ulrich. 2005-2006. "The Remedy of Avoidance of Contract Under CISG - 
General Remarks and Special Cases." 25 Journal of Law and Commerce.  
McCamus, John D. 2003. "Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Perspective." Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 36.2 943-974. 
McCamus, John D. 2011. "The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment." Canadian Bar Review 90.2 439-467. 
Morrissey, Joseph F., and Jack M. Graves. 2008. International Sales Law and Arbitration. 
Kluwer Law International. 
O'Byme, Shannon K. 1995. "Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent 
Developments." 74 Canadian Bar Review. 70.  
O'Dair, Richard. 1993. "Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract and the Theory 
of Efficient Breach: Some Reflections." 46 Current Legal Problems 113.  
Perillo, Joseph M. 1994. "Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The 
Black Letter Text and a Review." 63 Fordham Law Review 281 (Available at: 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol63/iss2/1).  
Posner, Richard A. 2007. Economic Analysis of Law. 7th ed. Wolters Kluwer for Aspen 
Publishers. 
Posner, Richard. 1998. "Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic 
Analysis of Law." University of Chicago Law School, Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper 53.  
Powers, Paul J. 1999. "Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations 
Convention on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." 18 Journal of 
Law & Commerce (Available at: 
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/powers.html) 333-353. 
Povrzenic, Nives. 1997. "Interpretation and gap-filling under the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." Pace Law School 
Institute of International Law (Available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/gapfill.html).  
Rawls, John. 1973. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. 
Reich, Arie. n.d. "Headnote on Adras Construction Co. Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones GmbH." 
CISG CASE PRESENTATION (Pace Law Web Article at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/881102i5.html). 
Roberts, Caprice L. 2009. "Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach 
of Contract." 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991.  
XII 
 
Roberts, Caprice L. 2008. "Restitutionary Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of 
Contract and Mitigation of Damages." 42 Loyola L.A. Law Review 131. 
Roberts, Caprice L. 2016. "Supreme Disgorgement." 68 Florida Law Review.  
Rogers, James S. 2007. "Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
of Restitution." Wake Forest Law Review 42 55-91. 
Rosett, Arthur. 1984. "Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." Vol 45 Ohio State Law Journal 
(Available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rossett.html). 
Saidov, Djakhongir. 2001. "Methods of Limiting Damages under the Vienna  Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." Pace Law Web Article 
(Available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/saidov.html). 
— 2008. The Law of Damages in International Sales: The CISG and other International 
Instruments. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Saidov, Djakhongir, and Ralph Cunnington. 2008. "Current Themes in the Law of 
Contract Damages: Introductory Remarks." In Contract Damages: Domestic and 
International Perspectives, edited by Djokhongir Saidov and Ralph Cunnington. 
Hart Publishing. 
Schlechtriem, Peter. 2005. "Article 7." In Commentary on the Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) , by Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg 
Schwenzer, edited by Peter and Schwenzer, Ingeborg (eds.) Schlechtriem, 93-110. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schlechtriem, Peter. 1991/1992. "Uniform Sales Law, The Experience with Uniform 
Sales Laws in the Federal Republic of Germany." Juridisk Tidskrift, Volume 3 1-
22. 
Schmidt-Ahrendts, Nils. 2012. "Disgorgement of Profits under the CISG." State of Play: 
The 3rd Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference, 89-102. 
Schwartz, Alan. 1979. "The Case for Specific Performance." Faculty Scholarship Series. 
Paper 1118, 271 (Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1118).  
Schwenzer Ingeborg, Hachem Pascal. 2008. "The Scope of the CISG Provisions on 
Damages." Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 
(Oxford) 91-105. 
Schwenzer, Ingeborg. 2010. "Art 74." In Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sales of Goods (CISG), by Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg 
Schwenzer, edited by Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed). Oxford. 
Schwenzer, Ingeborg. 2010. "Section II. Damages. Arts. 74 –77." In Commentary on the 
UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), by Peter Schlechtriem 




Schwenzer, Ingeborg, and Pascal Hachem. 2010. "Chapter 2. General Provisions. Art. 7." 
In Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
by Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer, edited by Schwenzer I (ed.), 120–
144. Oxford University Press. 
Schwenzer, Ingeborg, and Pascal Hachem. 2008. "The Scope of the CISG Provisions on 
Damages." In Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives , by 
Djangkohir Saidov and Ralph Cunnington, edited by Saidov D and Cunnington 
R, 91-106. Hart Publishing. 
Schwenzer, Ingeborg, Pascal Hachem, and Christopher Kee. 2012. Global Sales and 
Contract Law. Oxford University Press. 
Shavell, Steven. 2005. "Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract" 
Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion 
Paper No. 532 (Available at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Shavell_532.pdf).  
Sica, Lucia Carvalhal. 2006. "Gap-filling in the CISG: May the UNIDROIT Principles 
Supplement the Gaps in the Convention?" Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 1 (Available at: http://njcl.dk/articles/2006-1/article2.pdf.).  
Siems, Mathias. 2003. "Disgorgement of Profits for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Analysis." Edinburgh Law Review 7 (1). 
Sim, Disa. 2001. "The Scope and Application of Good Faith in the Vienna Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." Pace Database [at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sim1.html.].  
Smith, Lionel. 2012. "Book Review of “Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment"." 57:3 McGill Law Journal 629-638. 
Smith, Lionel D. 1994-1995. "Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract: 
Property, Contract and "Efficient Breach"" 24 Canadian Business and Law 
Journal 121.  
Smith, Lionel. 2012. "Legal Epistemology in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment." Boston University Law Review [Vol. 92:899].  
Summers, Robert S. 1982. "The General Duty of Good Faithv- Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization." 67 Cornell Law Review 810.  
Takawira, Admire. 2007. "Departing from mere compromise: Reformulating the remedy 
of specific performance under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) in line with the Convention's underlying goals." Pace Law Web Article 
(at: https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/takawira.html).  
Temple, Adam. 2008. "Disgorgement Damages for Breach of Contract." Denning Law 
Journal 20: 87-110. 
Thel, Steve, and Peter Siegelman. 2011. "You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A 






Traynor, Michael. 2011. "The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment: 
Some Introductory Suggestions." Washington and Lee Law Review Vol. 68 
(Available at: http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/law%20review/68-
3n.4Traynor.pdf) 899-910. 
Waddams, Stephen. 2008. "Gains Derived from Breach of Contract: Historical and 
Conceptual Perspectives." In Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
Perspectives, by Ralp Cunnington and Djakhongir Saidov, edited by Saidov D 
and Cunnington R (eds), 187-206. Hart Publishing. 
Walt, Steven D. 2014. "Modest Role of Good Faith in Uniform Sales Law." 8 Virginia 
Public Law and Legal Theory 37-73. 
Walt, Steven. 1991. "For Specific Performance Under the United Nations Sales 
Convention." 26 Texas International Law Journal 211-251. 
Warhol, Craig S. 1998. "Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: 
The Judicial Rejection of Efficient Breach." 20 Cardozo Law Review 321.  
Watterson, Stephen. 2015. "Gain-Based Remedies for Civil Wrongs in England and 
Wales." In Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies throughout the World, 
by André Janssen Ewoud Hondius, edited by André Janssen Ewoud Hondius. 
Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. 
Weinrib, Ernest J. 2003. "Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies." 78 
Chicago- Kent Law Review 55.  
Weinrib, Ernest J. 1994. "The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice." 
44 Duke Law Journal (Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol44/iss2/2) 277-297. 
Weinrib, Ernest. 2000. "Restitutionary Remedies as Corrective Justice." 1 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 1-37. 
Worthington, Sarah. 1999. "Reconsidering Disgorgement for Wrongs." 62(2) Modern 
Law Review 218. 
Yehuda, Adar. 2014. "Israel." In International Sales Law, A Global Challenge, edited by 
DiMatteo Larry A. (editor), 518–538. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Zak, Paul J. and Stephen Knack. 2001. "TRUST AND GROWTH." The Economic 
Journal, 111 (April) (Royal Economic Society) 295-321. 
Zeller, Bruno. 2009. Damages under the Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods. 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Zeller, Bruno. 2003. "Good Faith - Is it a Contractual Obligation?" Bond Law Review Vol 
15, Issue 2 215-239. 
Zeller, Bruno. 2000. "Good Faith - The Scarlet Pimpernel of the CISG ." Pace Law School 






CISG / Convention – United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods 1980 
PECL – The Principles of European Contract Law 
PICC – The UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts (2010) 
R3RUE – Restatement (Third) of Resitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) 
UCC – Uniform Commercial Code of the U.S. 
ULIS – Convention relating to a Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (the 
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1.1 Overview of the Subject Matter and Approach 
This thesis intends to lay out a thorough description of the remedial instrument known as 
disgorgement and the practical and principled needs it is designed to attend to, as well as 
to examine whether there might be a prospect of its acceptance under the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods1 (CISG).  
The policy perspectives said to underlie the stripping of profits gained from a breach of 
contract i.e. disgorgement, include fairness and good faith. This thesis focuses particu-
larly on this remedy in the context of contract law and sales of goods.  A closely related 
question arises from the traditional approach to contractual damages, going all the way to 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and his views regarding contract damages presented in “The Path 
of the Law.2  
In contract law, the duty of a party breaching a contract has traditionally been constructed 
as a duty to pay damages and nothing more. A possible problem emerges when the breach 
is motivated by an intention to reach more profits than would have been obtained by hon-
oring the original contract. The question is whether or not a court or a tribunal can order 
the breaching party to hand over the profits it acquired through its breach under any cir-
cumstances. The question is fairly simple but the necessary considerations and subsequent 
answers are considerably more complex. 
At the time of the drafting of the CISG, there existed a largely unanimous agreement 
about the function and nature of contract damages among the drafting parties. Thus, the 
issue of disgorgement was not deliberated in detail or otherwise. The eventual conclusion 
was that the guiding principle regarding damages under the Convention should be full 
compensation, meaning that the injured party should be put in a position it would have 
                                                
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1498 UNTS 3 (adopted 11 
April 1980, entered into force 1 January 1988). Also referred to as “the Convention”. 
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review 457 (1897). 
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been in without the breach. This rule is widely accepted within the member states com-
prising of different legal traditions. 
However, although the full compensation principle and the restriction of damages to the 
extent of the actual economic loss is a relatively straightforward rule of thumb, what is 
worth recognizing is that possible exceptions to this rule were not discussed in detail as a 
separate issue at the time of drafting the CISG. There is no denying the status of full 
compensation as a well-reasoned principle governing the general application of the dam-
ages provisions of the CISG. But since the drafting of the CISG, questions have emerged 
concerning claiming the connection between verifiable loss and damages as an absolute.  
A particular emphasis among the issues involved in the application of the CISG will be 
placed on the principle of good faith and its interpretation as well as the differently per-
ceived viewpoints regarding this issue in common- and civil law legal systems. Indeed, 
the role and interpretation of good faith as a legal principle, both domestically and in 
international trade, has been the subject of noticeable discussion and re-evaluation.  
Another issue that is touched upon is the doctrine of restitution and unjust enrichment, 
since certain domestic solutions concerning disgorgement in contract law have evolved 
partially from concepts traditionally regarded as stemming from the law of restitution. At 
first glance, this might seem a biased bending of existing doctrines out of place, but when 
reflected against the CISG’s interpretational dynamics that is largely based on the infer-
ence and application of general principles, these considerations should be deemed highly 
relevant.  
The principle of unjust enrichment undoubtedly shares elements with the arguments of-
fered in justifying disgorgement, but the analysis will be limited on this front as disgorge-
ment is more often than not addressed within the doctrine of damages because scholars 
who have contemplated this issue usually and understandably examine disgorgement 
through the lens of damages provisions rather than the restitution provisions. In this the-
sis, mostly due to the relevant comparative considerations that will be made, I will exam-
ine components from both doctrines. 
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Referring to the comparative considerations, in the U.S. – one of the most prominent 
member states as regards to economic influence3 – the tide has been turning away from 
the ‘Holmesian’ paradigm of contract damages. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment issued by the American Law Institute was published in 2011 and 
it laid down rules which not only enable the targeting of breaching party’s profits in spe-
cific circumstances but also sets out the general conditions under which this would be 
justified.  
This development becomes even more interesting when we recognize the fact that as is 
the case with the CISG, likewise in American contract law, damages for breach of con-
tract are based on the expectation interest rule. Thus, the view that expectation interest as 
the general rule of damages can coexist with the more recently recognized ‘disgorgement 
interest’, or rather, with more concrete manifestations of the ‘performance interest’ in 
specific circumstances has arguably made itself into the mainstream of contract law. 
This thesis adheres to a growing and established, but sometimes overlooked, dialogue 
between different legal systems and, therefore, there should be no confusion of its partly 
comparative nature. While a substantial emphasis is placed on contract damages in com-
mon law, particularly American contract law, the primary purpose of this thesis is to ex-
amine the interpretation dynamics and future perspectives of the CISG.  
Through an issue-specific and comparative approach, this paper intends to highlight and 
introduce viewpoints that flow either from certain universal legal theories or comparative 
analysis to the degree to which they might have relevance and prove useful in examining 
contract damages under the CISG. The intention is to supplement the analysis of the CISG 
in this regard by also examining viewpoints that have been developing or put forth in 
other contexts. I argue that such a method has the potential to broaden perspectives for 
academics and practitioners equally in the field of international commercial law. 
As Schwenzer and Hachem have stated: “If [the CISG] does not respond to current de-
mands and continues to focus on the state of discussion prevalent in the 1970s (or more 
accurately the nineteenth century), it risks falling back into obscurity. The necessary ad-
                                                




justments will then be made by the concurrent application of domestic remedies to pre-
cisely those cases for which the CISG was originally designed. The battle for uniformity 
fought by the CISG would be lost.”4 
1.2 The CISG 
The CISG has been described as “the most significant piece of substantive contract leg-
islation in effect at the international level”.5 A fact that speaks for this assessment is that 
since its adoption in 1980, the Convention has been joined by 87 states, including all of 
the major industrial countries (except the United Kingdom).6 It is beyond any doubt that 
the CISG has been a great success in the field of international trade and commerce of sale 
of goods. It has provided a well-functioning legal tool for cross-border sales and has stood 
the test of time as it continues to operate in the era of economic globalization.  
The international trade has benefitted from reduced transaction costs and improved legal 
certainty for parties involved in dispute resolution brought on by the CISG. Still, it is 
worthy of remembering that the CISG is essentially a delicately composed compromise 
between various legal systems and that as such it was not drafted to be an all-encompass-
ing statute of law. This, in tandem with the fact that not all of the specific provisions of 
the CISG were discussed in detail, means that although the basic rules laid out in the 
CISG are clear, the same does not necessarily apply to the interpretation of those rules. 
This thesis will deal with the general damages provision of the CISG, namely Art. 74, but 
will also examine other provisions and principles under which disgorgement of profits 
should be interpreted. However, the main focus of this thesis regarding the CISG will be 
on Art. 74 (which is said to be one of the most actively discussed and litigated provisions 
of the Convention)7 and the rules of interpretation that ultimately govern the reading of 
                                                
4 Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, ‘The Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages’, in Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives, at 91-105. 
5 Joseph Lookofsky ‘The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of 
Goods’, in Blanpain (ed) International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Contracts (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2000). 
6 The complete list of all 87 contracting States is available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/un-
citral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html. 
7 John Y. Gotanda, ‘Awarding Damages Under the United Nations Convention on the International Sales 
of Goods: A Matter of Interpretation’, 37 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2005), 95-140 at 95. 
See also Bruno Zeller, ‘Damages under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods’, (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, New York, 2009); Djakhongir Saidov, ‘The Law of Damages 
in International Sales: The CISG and other international Instruments’, (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publish-
ing, Oregon, 2008). 
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all of the Convention. As the general provision for the recovery of damages, Art. 74’s 
interpretation is naturally of a great importance.  
This thesis intends to add to the ongoing discussion about disgorgement by providing the 
essential background as well as introduce recent changes concerning the acceptability of 
disgorgement in Common law legal systems. Scholarly writings pertaining to American 
contract law will receive considerable attention due to the richness of its disgorgement 
discourse. However unorthodox this approach might appear to a devoted CISG-commen-
tator, I feel that in order to comprehensively understand the disgorgement remedy and to 
eventually project this understanding into the framework of the CISG, a portion of a com-
parative and authentic study is called for. 
As the CISG is no exception in having to evolve as new developments and challenges 
arise in international trade, its interpretation needs a certain amount of flexibility in order 
to keep up with said changes. Because one such challenge arguably stems from American 
contract law, we need to have a closer look at what exactly is suggested and how it is 
reasoned. As it turns out, one of the most prominent arguments in favor of disgorgement 
for breach of contract shares common ground with the ongoing debate concerning the 
significance of good faith under the CISG.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
As an introduction to the remedy’s origins and to the relevant terminology, this thesis will 
first provide an overview of the disgorgement discourse, with emphasis on the framework 
of American contract law (for reasons explained above), with required limitations to the 
subject matter in order to maintain sensible relevance to the CISG (2.). 
The following part of this paper (3.) will dig deeper into the discourse by examining the 
most common arguments presented, both for and against disgorgement, in the relevant 
legal literature. After the examination of general perspectives in a comparative context of 
the issue, the reader will be introduced to a specific manifestation of the thus far outlined 
legal perspectives, namely the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
(4.).   
Finally, the thesis switches focus to the CISG and presents the basic rules regarding dam-
ages for breach of contract under the CISG (5.). From there, I will proceed to examine 
the relevant rules and principles governing the interpretation of the CISG (6.) as well as 
6 
 
analyze the most important general principles in relation to disgorgement (7.). This will 
be necessary in order to draw the conclusions as to what extent disgorgement could fit 
into the framework of the CISG and what the future might hold in this respect (8.). 
Ultimately, this thesis analyzes the recent developments in the interpretation of contract 
law principles concerning damages. In the U.S. as well as in other common law jurisdic-
tions, the landscape seems to be changing with respect to the dynamics of contractual 
damages and, for the CISG to hold its place as a relevant and efficient instrument in the 
long run, these changes should not be left without appropriate attention in the discussion 
thereof.  
As disgorgement is likely to remain a controversial and debated issue, there is no imme-
diate prospect for any definite or final conclusions to be achieved regarding the subject. 
However, this thesis intends to consider the possible interpretative transitions regarding 
the CISG that could potentially broaden the scope of full compensation from the prevail-




2. What is Disgorgement? 
 
In order to grasp the general issue briefly presented above, it should be clarified what is 
meant when we are talking about disgorgement of profits. In this chapter, I will introduce 
the basic concept of disgorgement as a legal instrument. This will be conducted by first 
explaining the traditional contract law principle regarding damages for breach of contract 
because it was this principle that jumpstarted the arguments for recognizing disgorgement 
as a viable remedy.  
I will also discuss the terminology regarding disgorgement. Subsequently, I describe the 
background and previous development of the relevant discourse originated predominantly 
in common law legal tradition. This chapter will close in a brief introduction of the most 
well-known cases which have emerged as challenging the traditional contract law ap-
proach and which have gathered much of the academic interest.  
2.1 Terminology 
 
Despite the statement made by Lord Steyn in the hallmark case Attorney General v. Blake 
regarding disgorgement of profits, where he stated that “the terminology is less important 
than the substance”,8 it is beneficial for the purposes of this thesis to provide insight to 
the relevant terminology in order to avoid misunderstandings and distracting polysemy. 
Disgorgement of profits generally refers to stripping the gains of a wrongdoer which were 
made through a wrong.9 Correspondingly, the disgorged profit is awarded to the injured 
party, for as long as the award takes place in a contract law setting. Unlike damages, 
disgorgement is not typically available in most jurisdictions for private law wrongs such 
as breach of contractual obligation. Furthermore, where the remedy is available, it is usu-
ally bounded by supplementary conditions or factors that differentiate from a typical 
breach of contract scenario.10 
                                                
8 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (H.L.), at 291. 
9 E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of 
Contract’, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341-1342 (1985); Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen, ‘Chapter 26. Dis-
gorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies throughout the World’ in Hondius E and Janssen A (eds), 
Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland 2015), at 475-476. 
10 Stephen Watterson, ‘Gain-Based Remedies for Civil Wrongs in England and Wales’ in Ewoud Hondius 
and André Janssen (ed.) Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer 
International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015), at 45-56; Mathias Siems, ’Disgorgement of profits for breach 
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It should be noted that over time, there has been a number of different terms used for an 
award of ordering a defaulting party to give up the profits gained through a breach of 
contract. This type of award has also been referred to as ‘an account of profits’,11 ‘resti-
tutionary damages’,12 and ‘disgorgement damages.’13 
As regards the term ‘restitutionary damages’, it could be noted that both words can be 
misleading since the use of the word ‘damages’ is a misnomer in the sense that the term 
might imply that the suffered loss is the decisive factor. The word ‘restitutionary’ is faulty 
in its own right because the term ‘restitutionary damages’ may seem to contradict the 
compensatory function of damages. Furthermore, restitution is commonly understood to 
imply that you have to give back something to its proper owner.14 Also, avoiding the use 
of the word ‘restitution’ avoids confusion with the situation where a contract has been 
terminated because of a breach.15 Flowing from the aforementioned, one might even argue 
that the term ‘restitutionary damages’ is slightly paradoxical.  
When it comes to the phrase “account of profits for breach of contract”, it is argued that 
it is not completely adequate because of its ties to equity law.16 This can be seen as having 
an effect on the term’s neutrality and, thereby, to its relevant applicability in current con-
text. The term ‘gain-based damages’ has also gathered some attraction in legal literature17, 
but it is mostly used as an umbrella-term to describe remedies that are constructed through 
reference to the defendant’s gain.18 
The usage of the term ‘disgorgement’ tends to differentiate between awards based upon 
movement of some value between the parties to a contract, which must be given back 
                                                
of contract: a comparative analysis’ (2003) 7(1) Edinburgh Law Review 27, at 43-44; Hanoch Dagan, ‘Res-
titutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory’ (2000) Vol. 1 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 115-154, at 116. 
11 Used e.g. by Lord Nicholls in Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (H.L.).  
12 Peter Birks, ‘An Introduction to the Law of Restitution’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); AS Burrows, 
‘The Law of Restitution’ (London: Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2002). 
13 See James Edelman, ‘Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property’ (Oxford: 
Hart, 2002). 
14 Andrew Botterell, ‘Contractual Performance, corrective justice, and disgorgement for breach of contract’, 
Legal Theory, 16(3) (2010), 135-160, at 137. 
15 Siems (n 10), at 28. Siems states also that there is no equivalent contradiction in concepts such as nominal 
or exemplary damages because they are exceptions to the general rule. 
16 Id., at 28-29. 
17 See e.g. Edelman (fn 13); David Campbell, ‘A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution 
§ 39', 68 Washington & Lee Law Review 1063 (2011); Caprice L. Roberts, ‘Restitutionary Disgorgement 
for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages’, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 131 (2008). 
18 Botterell (n 14), at 136. 
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(restitutionary award), and awards that target the gains made by the breaching party from 
another source, which the injured party demands to be given up (disgorgement award).19  
‘Disgorgement’ is arguably the most widely spread term in relation to the issue at hand. 
It is also used regularly in the context of the CISG.20 Due to the term’s international usage 
and specificity, it can be characterized as the most appropriate21 and, therefore, it is the 
word of choice of this thesis also. 
Especially in the U.S, where the disgorgement discourse has arguably been the most per-
vasive, there has been comprehensive theorization about different variations of disgorge-
ment in contract law as well as efforts to systematize its usage.22 It is therefore submitted 
that, in relation to disgorgement of profits, even under the CISG, it should be seen fruitful 
to introduce different viewpoints into the discussion. This is especially so when different 
concepts being used are overlapping and are not strictly tied to just one part of contract 
law in their usage. Respectively, it has been said that disgorgement is familiar to the law 
of restitution and rooted in unjust enrichment and has only recently started to appear more 
distinctly in the context of a certain set of contractual breaches.23 
Some might argue that restitution and unjust enrichment are concepts so distinct com-
pared to the domain of contractual damages that there should be no overlapping in the 
analysis. This flows from a viewpoint that considers restitution and the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment as applicable only in circumstances where one has been unjustly enriched at 
the expense of the other. Furthermore, because it can be argued that with disgorgement, 
the profits are not made at the expense of the non-defaulting party, the injured party’s loss 
should be restored simply through compensatory damages. 
However, there are scholars who contest this view by arguing that there are some cases 
in which “a party’s profitable breach of contract may be a source of unjust enrichment at 
the expense of the other contracting party.”24 The need to locate disgorgement rigidly to 
                                                
19 Adam Temple, ‘Disgorgement Damages for Breach of Contract’, Denning Law Journal 2008 Vol 20 pp 
87-110, at 88. 
20 See e.g. Ingeborg Schwenzer ‘Section II. Damages. Arts. 74 –77’ in Ingeborg Schwenzer I (ed), Com-
mentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2010 pp. 999-1049), at 1017; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Pascal Hachem and Christopher Kee, ‘Global 
Sales and Contract Law’ (Oxford University Press 2012); Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts, ‘Disgorgement of Profits 
under the CISG’ in Schwenzer I and Spagnolo L (eds), State of Play: The 3rd Annual MAA Schlechtriem 
CISG Conference  (Eleven International Publishing 2012 pp. 89– 102). 
21 Siems (n 10), at 29. 
22 See generally ‘Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’, The American Law Institute 
(St Paul: American Law Institute, 2011), Reporter: Andrew Kull (hereinafter: ‘R3RUE’). 
23 Roberts (n 17), at 145. 
24 R3RUE (n 22), cmt. a. 
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a certain field of law has been questioned by stating that “…it must be asked whether it 
is necessary to assign the doctrine exclusively to either the restitutionary or the contrac-
tual domain.”25 On one hand, disgorgement undoubtedly is a remedy for a breach of con-
tract, but on the other hand, many instances of disgorgement relief are considered to be 
remedies for some type of unjust enrichment. 26  
Generally, ‘unjust enrichment’ is said to occur when a defendant retains a benefit for 
which the defendant has not paid even though he should have. To make these definitions 
perhaps even more indefinite, it has been suggested that the lines between the doctrinal 
areas of law of restitution and contract law are not distinct.27 
Still, one author notes that those who use the term ‘disgorgement’ tend to do so for the 
sake of setting apart awards based on transferal of some value between claimant and de-
fendant, which must be given back (restitution) from awards where defendant has ac-
quired value from elsewhere and which the claimant claims to be given up (disgorge-
ment).28 In this specific sense, the concepts of restitution and disgorgement are distinct. 
While this division can serve to structure the theoretical roots of the issue, the problem is 
that the abovementioned line has been obscured by conceptualizing the scenario where 
the value is collected from another source than the contract partner in a way that this 
conduct is still observed from the inherently bipolar perspective of the contract and the 
contract parties.  
One example of this is the argument that when a party chooses to not to perform a contract 
promise and, for instance, delivers goods to a third party. This scenario can be construed 
through a hypothetical question of what the aggrieved party would have accepted as a 
price for lifting the contractual duty. Thereby, even though the benefit might have come 
from a third party, it cannot be completely dismissed that for the seller to reach such a 
benefit is contingent on breaching its original contract.29  
Unjust enrichment, in turn, can be briefly described as an instrument, that has evolved 
outside of the contract law domain, aiming to restore a sum to its original and just pos-
sessor that the defendant has unjustly received at the expense of the claimant. It differs 
                                                
25 McCamus, John D. "Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective." Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review 36.2 (2003), 943-974, at 974. 
26 Id. 
27 Roberts (n 17), at 132-133, 135-136, 139.  
28 Temple (n 19), at 88; Botterell (n 14), at 135-137. 
29 John D. McCamus, ‘The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’, Canadian Bar Re-
view 90.2 (2011) 439-467, at 446 (referring to the R3RUE (n 22), at 3). 
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from disgorgement quite significantly, as the principle of unjust enrichment does not re-
quire any wrong on the part of the defendant. In the case of disgorgement, the purpose is 
to take away the profit that the defendant made by wronging (breaching the contract) the 
claimant.30 Again, some argue that the lines between the doctrines of disgorgement, con-
tract law, restitution law and unjust enrichment are not as separate and distinct.31 
Also, the disgorged profit does not necessarily need to be made at the expense of the 
injured party,32 because the remedy places its focus on the gain of the breaching party and 
does not require corresponding loss on the side of the claimant. Thereby, with disgorge-
ment, it is possible that the sum awarded exceeds the loss of the claimant and thus dis-
tributes a kind of windfall profit to the injured party. Needless to say, as a possible out-
come of disgorgement, this has brought the most significant amount of controversy 
around the subject. 
2.2 Traditional Contract Law Approach  
 
“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay dam-
ages if you do not keep it, and nothing else.”33 These oft-cited words of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes from his famous essay “The Path of the Law” are said to reflect conventional 
contract law wisdom and American law’s traditional approach to contract damages. This 
sentiment has also been depicted more recently: “One is generally free to decline perfor-
mance, provided that one then becomes liable to compensate the other party.”34 This kind 
of approach has attracted support from the academic faction of law and economics35, and 
it has also produced a viewpoint relating to disgorgement known as the efficient breach-
theory, which will be addressed in detail below. 
In addition, under the traditional approach of American law, breach of contract is evalu-
ated according to the strict liability rule.36 This means that the question is whether a de-
fendant breached as the why’s and how’s are essentially irrelevant. 
                                                
30 Sarah Worthington, ‘Reconsidering Disgorgement for Wrongs’ (1999) 62(2) Modern Law Review 218, 
at 220. 
31 Roberts (n 17), at 139. 
32 Unless the breach itself as a violation of one’s rights is seen as being made ”at the expense” of the non-
defaulting party. 
33 Holmes (n 2), at 462. 
34 Siems (n 10), at 51. 
35 See Richard A. Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Law’ (7th ed. 2007), at 118-126. 
36 Curtis Bridgeman, ‘Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law’, 75 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3013 (2007), at 3016–17. 
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It has been suggested that disgorgement will alter the doctrinal landscape of contract law 
partly because the foundational principles of the remedy conflicts with traditional contract 
law principles.37 Contract law’s principle idea concerning damages still contends that the 
purpose of damages is compensation.  
Also, the unavailability of punitive damages for breach of contract is based on this prin-
ciple.38 As the function of damages in contract law is not even partly the punishing of the 
contract breaker, it can be construed that contract damages are focused on the claimant 
rather than the defendant.39 Contract damages, by design, are more concerned with the 
aggrieved party’s loss than any gain on the part of the breaching party precisely because 
the main goal of contract damages is and has been compensation. 
As a general rule, the injured party is entitled to claim damages from the breaching party. 
Pursuant to established principles of contract law, the recoverable damages are compen-
satory in nature and are to be calculated based on the expectancy principle.40 
This principle translates to so-called expectation damages, which were articulated in a 
significant common law precedent in the following manner;  
 “where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so 
 far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to 
 damages, as if the contract had been performed”.41  
In other words, the claimant is deemed entitled to recover the amount of money that will 
place the claimant in the position she would have been in if the defendant would have 
fully performed his contractual obligations.42 This amount is often-times referred to as 
‘benefit of the bargain’.43 Generally, this rule applies both in civil- and common law and 
also the CISG adheres to this rule.44 
                                                
37 Roberts (n 17), at 134. 
38 Id., at 148-149. For comparative study of punitive damages see John Y. Gotanda, ‘Punitive Damages: A 
Comparative Analysis’, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. p. 391 (2004). 
39 Roberts (17), at 148. 
40 McCamus (n 25), at 943-944. 
41 Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 365 (Exch.). In similar vein see Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank 
v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 108, 114 (2003) ("One approach [to breach-of-contract damages] is to give the 
nonbreaching party the benefits he or she expected to receive had the breach not occurred, also known as 
the 'benefit of the bargain"). 
42 McCamus (n 25), at 944. 
43 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, ‘Calculation of Damages under Article 74 CISG’, Rapporteur: 
Professor John Y. Gotanda. Adopted by the CISG Advisory Council at its Spring 2006 
meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, at 3.1. 
44 Id. (fn 3): Keneric Tractor Sales Ltd. v. Langille, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 440 (Can.); Wertheim v. Chicoutimi 
Pulp Co., [1911] A.C. 301 (P.C. 1910) (Eng.); Robinson v. Harman, 154 Eng. Rep. 363 (Ex. 1848). 
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As compensatory damages are based on the notion that compensation is meant to undo 
the adverse effects the breach has caused to the aggrieved party, they can be described as 
centered around the aggrieved party. Their rationale is to measure the loss incurred by the 
aggrieved party and then restore that amount. In contrast to the traditional compensatory 
viewpoint, disgorgement is interested in the defendant’s gain.  
Disgorgement can be described as a form of gain-based damages as it focuses on the gain 
or benefits the breaching party has ‘wrongfully’ obtained. Therefore, even if disgorge-
ment for a breach of contract could be awarded without the intention of punishing the 
breaching party, the remedy undoubtedly shifts the focus from the claimant’s loss to the 
gain of the defendant.45 
It follows from this that disgorgement does not fall under the general term ‘compensatory 
damages’, even though it might achieve compensating the aggrieved party in the pro-
cess.46 Also, it should be noted that if the amount of loss is quantified through reference 
to the breaching party’s profit, it does not automatically render the award as disgorge-
ment. Instead, this can be seen merely as a method for quantifying damages as long as it 
can be reasonably proven that the amount of the profit reflects the amount of the loss.  
Traditionally, disgorgement has not been available for a breach of contract. In most coun-
tries, the orthodox remedial response to a contract breach is that the claimant is able to 
receive compensation for the loss he or she has actually suffered. Correspondingly, fo-
cusing on the profit received by the defendant is seen as inappropriate. Nevertheless, there 
are arguments defying this “monopoly of compensation” regarding contract damages put 
forth in varying decisions and scholarly writings that support the contention that in some 
cases, the injured party should be able to claim the benefit that the other party has 
achieved through a breach of contract.47 
However, there are various justifications for the traditional approach. Some are anchored 
to the ‘Holmesian’ view of contract damages. Holmes, perhaps even more farsightedly 
than he might have realized, thought that the doctrine he subscribed to “stinks in the nos-
trils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.”.48  
                                                
45 Roberts (n 17), at 150; CISG Advisory Council Op. No. 6, at 1.1, 3.1. 
46 Stephen Waddams, ‘Gains Derived from Breach of Contract: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives’ 
in Saidov D and Cunnington R (eds), Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 187-206, at 193. 
47 Siems (n 10), at 28. 
48 Holmes (n 2), at 462. 
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As a criticism, Holmes’ assertion that contractual obligation as a duty should be con-
structed in terms of having the option between performance and damages has been eval-
uated as “circular and unconvincing”.49 Respectively, favoring gain-based damages is 
said to be linked to strong ethical intuitions such as emphasizing the binding nature of 
contracts in that promises should be kept and that contract-breakers should not be allowed 
to profit from their wrongs.50  
Holmes’ view has been seen to implicitly include a more persuasive argument for the 
traditional approach. That is so because many breaches do not involve any form of bad 
faith. It would seem that in these cases compensatory damages are justified also from an 
ethical perspective. Arguably, more burdensome awards might be appropriate when there 
is unquestionable moral blame on the side of the breaching party, but if this suggestion 
were to be accepted, it would introduce undue uncertainty, in form of ethical evaluation, 
into the contract law system. And this is exactly what limiting damages only to compen-
sation achieves to avoid.51 Those who argue for the recognition of disgorgement are less 
troubled by this issue and some would favor a test based on moral culpability (good-/bad 
faith considerations) for the availability of disgorgement. 52  
Incidentally, to some extent, the willingness of courts to apply standards based on re-
quirements to act in good faith has been increasing, which suggests that issues of moral 
culpability are not precluded from judicial evaluation in the contractual context.53 Indeed, 
the pervasive but rather elusive question concerning the principle of good faith in contract 
law is arguably a major issue underlying the disgorgement debate and as such it will be 
discussed in detail below.  
Naturally, the role of good faith, as well as its development under the CISG will be ex-
amined due to its principal connection to the issue at hand. Different standpoints in the 
interpretation of good faith principle under the CISG might have varying implications 
regarding disgorgement as well. 
  
                                                
49 McCamus (n 25), at 948. 
50 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies’ (2003) 78 Chicago- 
Kent Law Review 55, at 71. 
51 McCamus (n 25), at 948-949. 
52 Peter Birks, ‘Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the Fusion of Law and Equity’, 
(1987) LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 421, at 442. 
53 See Shannon Kathleen O'Byme, Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent Developments, 74 CAN. 
BAR REv. 70, 93-94 (1995); McCamus (n 25), at 949 (fn 17). 
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3. The Disgorgement Debate 
 
After establishing the basis for our discussion of disgorgement, this chapter will now 
proceed to present the various arguments made for and against this rather controversial 
remedy in the context of contractual damages. This chapter will review relevant legal 
literature as well as the different concepts, theories, proposals and viewpoints presented 
therein.  
This will include a brief overview of the origins of disgorgement’s development (3.1). I 
will then introduce the basic concepts regarding the efficient breach theory (3.2) and the 
corrective justice theory’s account on the subject (3.3). These two theoretical perspectives 
have been chosen for their prominence within the discourse around disgorgement and 
equally importantly because of their universal nature as they are not attached to any spe-
cific legal system.  
This chapter is intended to provide a summary of the essential ideas presented by the legal 
scholars in this field. This should provide us the proper vehicle to eventually move into 
the evaluation of the CISG and its interpretation with the required background perspec-
tive. Before that, we are able to review the specific solution offered for the disgorgement 
‘debate’ in the U.S. with the appropriate background knowledge.  
3.1 The Origins of Disgorgement 
 
By and large, disgorgement has originated from the restitution doctrine of common law 
and more specifically from restitution in the context of contract law. This notion is based 
on a shared fundamental purpose between disgorgement and other restitutionary claims: 
to “prevent the defendant’s unjust enrichment by recapturing the gains the defendant se-
cured in a transaction.”.54 While the traditional claim for damages is seeking to measure 
the claimant’s loss and subsequently compensate that loss, restitution measures the de-
fendant’s gain and requires the defendant to disgorge the gains attributable to the subject 
transaction or wrongdoing.55 
                                                
54 Restatement (First) of Restitution § 1 (1937), cited in: Dan B. Dobbs, ‘Law of Remedies: Damages-
Equity-Restitution’ (2d ed. 1993), at 551–552. 
55 See id., at 555-556. 
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Recently, the law of restitution in common law has gathered much attention amongst An-
glo-American scholars and judiciary, specifically because of the debate regarding the is-
sue of whether or not disgorgement can supplement traditional contract remedies in the 
setting of breach of contract.56 The question of applicability of disgorgement has been 
described as surrounded by controversy57 and “devilishly difficult”.58 
In contract law, the traditional restitution alternative to a claim for damages has been the 
option of the injured party to treat the contract as discharged59 in certain circumstances, 
because of the breach and thereby demand restitution of the benefits that the injured party 
had already transferred to the party in default. Some suggest that this kind of recovery is 
made possible in order to avoid the unjust enrichment of the breaching party.60  
However, this is not entirely what disgorgement is about. Disgorgement would provide a 
further alternative for the injured party to bring a claim for an award to recover the bene-
fits acquired by the breaching party through its contract breach.61 
3.1.1 Disgorgement Outside Contract Law 
 
It is worth noting that before entering into the realm of contract law, disgorgement had 
established itself as a legitimate instrument in various fields of common law.62 One such 
example is where a party has profited by breaching its fiduciary duties. The fiduciary is 
normally made to disgorge all of the profits earned, even when there is no corresponding 
loss or expense on the side of the beneficiary. Similar rules can be found in doctrines 
relating to tortious wrongs, breaches of confidence and, although further from private 
law, profits of crime.63 
In the law of fiduciary obligations, disgorgement is an important remedy. If a fiduciary 
breaches his fiduciary obligation to achieve personal gain by abusing his position, prop-
erty or information entrusted to him, he must be subjected to disgorgement of that gain 
and surrender it to his beneficiary even if the beneficiary has not suffered any loss in the 
                                                
56 Dagan (n 10), at 116. 
57 McCamus (n 25), at 943. 
58 Andrew Burrows, ‘No Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract’, 1993 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. 
L.Q. 453, cited in: Weinrib (n 50), at 70. 
59 Cf. CISG’s terminology: ‘avoided’. 
60 McCamus (n 25), at 944. 
61 Id., at 944-945. 
62 Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law’, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 559 (2006), at 
563.  
63 McCamus (n 25), at 945-946. 
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process. The applicability of disgorgement in cases involving fiduciary obligations de-
rives from the relationship’s special nature in terms of trust and vulnerability. In fiduciary 
context, it is especially persuasive idea that one should not profit from one’s wrongful 
conduct.64  
Secondly, requiring disgorgement is said to materialize the implicit expectations of the 
beneficiary by way of shaping the conduct of fiduciaries to better reflect those expecta-
tions and by providing the fiduciaries with the right incentives.65 
Disgorgement can also be awarded when questions regarding property interests or rights 
are involved. One such instance is where a wrongdoer appropriates owner’s property. The 
wrongdoer is liable for the owner’s loss in conversion and the damages are normally cal-
culated by referring to the market price at the time of the conversion. But if the property 
is subsequently sold at a higher price by the wrongdoer to a third party, the aggrieved 
owner can take action to require the disgorgement of that price instead of the owner’s 
own loss. Also, an owner of a property can require disgorgement of wrongfully obtained 
(in violation of owner’s property rights) rental value of the property, even if such value 
would exceed the market price of the property.66 
In this light, if disgorgement is available for breach of fiduciary obligation, breach of 
confidence, tortious wrongdoings and, to some extent, in contractual settings to protect 
proprietary interests, it seems unclear why a similar remedy should be entirely precluded 
when it comes to a purely contractual breach.67 On the surface, it might seem confusing 
that proprietary interests are protected by disgorgement while the same level of protection 
is categorically refused in cases concerning breach of contract.68 
In a similar vein, refusal to grant disgorgement has even been considered as indirectly 
allowing the breaching party to “expropriate” the contractual rights of the promisee.69 
Admittedly, this view can be seen as fair in cases where damages based on expectancy 
principle would constitute in no compensation whatsoever. It has also been noted that the 
                                                
64 This is a general principle and as such it is not confined in law of fiduciary obligations. The principle is 
often invoked also in support of disgorgement in contract law and it will be elaborated in subsequent chap-
ters. 
65 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, ‘The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal 
Consequences’, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991), at 1049-1056. 
66 Eisenberg (n 62), at 563-564. 
67 McCamus (n 25), at 951-952. 
68 Id., at 952; Lionel D. Smith, ‘Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and 
"Efficient Breach"’, 24 CAN. Bus. L.J. 121 (1994-95), at 129-132. 
69 McCamus, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective, at 951-952. 
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impulse to grant disgorgement to achieve a just result in an individual case can be so 
strong that courts have occasionally, and to some extent arbitrarily, constructed concepts 
of fiduciary obligation and compensation to indirectly achieve the same results as with 
disgorgement.70  
Based on this observation, it can be argued that a clearer recognition of disgorgement for 
contract breach on a principled level would result in a more fruitful discussion about the 
specific situations and circumstances in which disgorgement could be appropriate and 
made available.71 
Regarding the comparison between standard contract law remedies and cases involving 
proprietary interests, it must be pointed out, however, that the special nature and status of 
proprietary interests are well recognized as the field of property law holds and adheres to 
its own foundational problems and concepts. In common law72, property rights are typi-
cally protected by the availability of (equitable) specific performance and injunctions 
when ordinary claim for damages is deemed inadequate to protect such interests.73  
Therefore, in cases that involve proprietary interests, disgorgement should arguably be 
seen as an alternative response to the problem concerning the inadequacy of compensa-
tory damages where specific performance would be either impossible, unduly burden-
some or, for some other reason, unsuitable.74 
As for the U.S. legal system, and in relation to the percolation of disgorgement from other 
fields of law and into contract law, one comment in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment describes the current state of affairs in the following manner: “In-
creased scholarly attention to the question [of disgorgement] in recent years has never-
theless produced a consensus that it is appropriate to treat a deliberate and profitable 
breach of contract by analogy to an intentional and profitable interference with other le-
gally protected interests.”.75 
                                                
70 Smith (n 68), at 126-129. 
71 McCamus (n 25), at 952. 
72 Predominantly in civil law legal systems as well.  
73 See e.g. Hanoch Dagan (n 10), at 132-139; Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357, 359(1). Interest-
ingly, disgorgement is not clearly categorized to either ‘equitable’ or ‘legal’ remedies: “Disgorgement 
never solidified as a pure equitable or legal remedy. Rulings are inconsistent given the functional appear-
ance of disgorgement as a monetary award. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution classifies the dis-
gorgement remedy as legal. Most courts, however, view disgorgement as equitable given its historical af-
filiation with the equitable remedy of accounting.”, Caprice L. Roberts, ‘Supreme Disgorgement’, 68 
Florida Law Review (2016), at 1426-1427. 
74 McCamus (n 25), at 958. 
75 R3RUE, §39, Reporter’s Note, at comment a. 
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A relevant observation regarding the latter part of this thesis is that, unlike any other 
common law country, the U.S. has adopted the principle of good faith in its Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.76 
3.1.2 Disgorgement’s Advancement into Contract Law – Introduction to the Blake v. At-
torney General and the Adras v. Harlow Jones 
 
There are two cases that have attracted much of the academic interest in the discourse 
about disgorgement. This subchapter will briefly introduce these to the reader for their 
influential nature as precedents, most of all in legal literature.77 The Blake v. Attorney 
General case78 (Blake case) is referenced in practically every piece of common law legal 
literature pertaining to disgorgement. Respectively, the case of Adras v. Harlow & Jones79 
(Adras case) holds a similar status within the CISG literature. 
The setting of the Blake case was that a spy for British intelligence services named George 
Blake turned out to be a double-spy in that he also spied for the Soviet Union. When his 
crimes were revealed, he was imprisoned but subsequently managed to escape. The case 
dealt with the appropriate legal reaction to profits that Blake made by writing and having 
published his memoirs. By writing and publishing the book, Blake clearly violated his 
confidentiality duties of his employment contract with the Crown. 
Thus, the Attorney General was certainly in a position to bring a claim against Blake for 
damages for breach of contract. Although, if damages were to be calculated on the basis 
of the expectancy principle, the Crown would not have been able to establish a compen-
sable loss. Notwithstanding, if Blake had performed his contract with the Crown, he could 
not have written the book and he would not have earned any profits. In these exceptional 
circumstances, the House of Lords decided to order the disgorgement of Blake’s profits 
and the famous precedent of granting disgorgement under the British contract law was 
made. 
                                                
76 See U.C.C. 1-203 (1978) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 205: ("Every contract imposes upon 
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."). 
77 For other prominent cases see e.g. AB Corp. v. CD Co. (The Sine Nomine), [2002] 1 LLOYD’S REP. 
805, 806 (stating that in an exceptional case a plaintiff could "obtain wrongful profits as damages for breach 
of contract," but that in this particular case, an efficient breach did not require disgorgement); Snepp v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
78 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (H.L.). 
79 Adras Construction Co. Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones (ISR, 1988). 
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The Adras case, in turn, dealt with a second sale setting and was ruled under the prede-
cessor of the CISG, namely the ULIS.80 Put briefly: the Supreme Court of Israel decided 
to override ULIS and apply the country’s domestic law instead to the effect of the princi-
ple of unjust enrichment manifesting in an award of disgorgement, despite the fact that 
the contract between the parties was not effectively avoided. This approach was strongly 
criticized as “being inconsistent with the objective of ULIS to provide uniformity in in-
ternational trade law”.81  
Schlechtriem had a strong opinion about the Israeli case. He underlined that “The same 
rule of priority of the Convention should apply if issues regulated by the Convention could 
lead to a remedy under domestic law which is inconsistent with the Convention. A good 
example is the Israeli case…”. He also stated that the uniformity achieved by the Con-
vention would have been in grave danger if national provisions could be applied in such 
instances, commenting on the ruling that “In this instance, the rules of the Convention 
and its requirement for certain remedies were pushed aside by a restitutionary remedy 
under domestic law.”.82 
The Adras Case is a good example in highlighting the risk of courts resorting to domestic 
law in that case when the international law did not provide for disgorgement of profits. 
Issues relating to the uniformity requirement in the interpretation of the CISG will be 
discussed below in chapters 6 And 7. 
3.2 Efficient Breach Theory and Disgorgement 
 
Of the different critiques of allowing the disgorgement measure in contract law, perhaps 
the most well-known is the so-called efficient breach theory. It takes the ethical paradigm 
that no one should benefit from their wrong-doing and turns it around by assessing con-
tract breaches from efficiency-perspective. The theory has its roots in the field of law and 
economics and one commentator has stated that: “Law and economics scholarship has 
advanced a number of provocative arguments in the name of efficiency but none is per-
haps quite so controversial as the argument behind the efficient breach hypothesis.”.83 
                                                
80 Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, The Hague, 1 July 1964, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 834, at 107.  
81 Arie Reich, ‘Headnote on Adras Construction Co. Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones GmbH’. 
82 Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Uniform Sales Law, The Experience with Uniform Sales Laws in the Federal Re-
public of Germany’, in: Juridisk Tidskrift, Volume 3 (1991/1992), 1–22, at 12-13. 
83 Richard Brooks, ‘The Efficient Performance Hypothesis’ (2006). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 
1698., at 570. 
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This chapter introduces and examines the efficient breach theory as well as brings forth 
some other efficiency factors to which scholars have paid attention. This chapter discusses 
the theory’s origins and basic concepts and also the reception and the most prevalent 
counter-arguments it has sparked. 
3.2.1 Efficient Breach as a Counter-argument for Disgorgement 
 
The principle that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to profit from his wrongs might, in 
general, favor the applicability of disgorgement.84 In contrast, the efficient breach theory 
effectively disregards the ethical perspective of the issue as well as other concerns of 
promise-keeping at large and, instead, focuses on what would be the best outcome in 
contract breach situations from the perspective of economic efficiency.  
In other words, it determines what kind of allocation of resources and liabilities results in 
the most proficient cumulating of those resources in the society in general. And the ques-
tion then becomes whether it is necessary to try and deter contract breaches which ulti-
mately allow the resources needed to perform the contract to be allocated more efficiently, 
even when taking into account the payable expectancy damages for the aggrieved party. 
One of the accounts of introducing this idea was formulated in the following manner: 
“Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit 
from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occu-
pied had performance been rendered.”.85  
It is said that the basis of the theory can be found already in writings of Holmes, as he 
contended that the duty to keep a contract in common law means the prediction that one 
must pay damages, but nothing else.86 Therefore, one should be free to decline to perform 
within the precondition that he or she becomes liable to compensate the other party.87  
                                                
84 Halifax Bldg. Soc'y v. Thomas, [1995] 4 All E.R. 673 (C.A.) (Eng.), cited in: McCamus (n 25), at 951. 
85 Robert L. Birmingham, ‘Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency’, 24 RUT-
GERS L. REV. (1970) 273, at 284. 
86 Holmes (n 2), at 462. 
87 Siems (n 10), at 51. 
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More recently, this line of reasoning has been supported in the economic analysis of law88 
presented most prominently by judge Richard Posner.89 His position was that if a third 
party is willing to pay enough for a commodity so that the promisor is able to realize a 
profit after compensating the promisee for her expectation, then the promisor should go 
ahead and sell the commodity to the third party, while the law should do no more than 
require the payment of the promisee's expectation interest.90  
It flows from this dynamic that an efficient breach of contract should in general91 not only 
be accepted but even encouraged because of its inherent feature of value-maximization. 
The counter-argument that the potential contract-breaker should renegotiate its contrac-
tual obligations and the release of those obligations is not regarded as persuasive due to 
the consequent additional transaction costs. Moreover, it has been argued that the ag-
grieved party remains indifferent as long as it receives full compensation for its loss.92 
This leads to the breach being ‘Pareto superior’ since, besides the net economic gain, no 
one will be left worse off than before as a result of the breach of contract.93  
In conclusion, the seller is better off, the second buyer is better off, and the original 
buyer’s loss has been duly compensated, which makes him indifferent about the whole 
incident. The theory naturally insists that this opportunity for more efficient allocation of 
resources will be lost if the seller is demanded to renegotiate and purchase a release from 
the first buyer and, therefore, the seller should be permitted to act unilaterally. Further-
more, a rule that might result in the stripping of the seller’s profits would effectively 
discourage the described-like efficient behavior.94  
It can be suggested that should the efficient breach theory hold true, it would be a strong 
argument against any excessive protection of the performance interest in contract law. 
This is because if disgorgement is available to the aggrieved party and the breaching party 
                                                
88 See Richard A. Posner, ‘Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law’, 
University of Chicago Law School, Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 53 (1998), at 2: ”The 
economic analysis of law, as it now exists not only in the United States but also in Europe, which has its 
own flourishing law and economics association, has both positive (that is, descriptive) and normative as-
pects. It tries to explain and predict the behavior of participants in and persons regulated by the law. It 
also tries to improve law by pointing out respects in which existing or proposed laws have unintended or 
undesirable consequences, whether on economic efficiency, or the distribution of income and wealth, or 
other values.”. 
89 See generally Posner (n 35). 
90 Id., at 118-26, 130-31. 
91 Even Posner has hinted of exceptions in case of opportunistic breach, Posner (n 35), at 117-126. 
92 D. Campbell and D. Harris, ‘In Defence of Breach: A Critique of Restitution and the Performance Inter-
est’, (2002) 22 Legal Studies 208 at 219; Temple (n 19), at 93. 
93 Siems (n 10), at 51-52. 
94 McCamus (n 25), at 949-950. 
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could be required to disgorge the gain from the breach, there is no incentive to strive for 
the extra profits via efficient breach.95 However, it has been opinioned that the mere fact 
that breaching an existing contractual obligation can be efficient (i.e. nonperformance 
might on occasion be more profitable than performance) is still judicially distinct from 
establishing a rule that renders it optional for the promisor to perform or not and make 
those gains accordingly.96 
3.2.2 The Reception and Critique of the Theory 
 
In general, what has most provoked disapproval of the efficient breach theory consists of 
strong moral sentiments regarding the possible optionality regarding performance and 
nonperformance of a contract. In simple terms, to not perform where one could, is not a 
‘right’ but is in fact a ‘wrong’, and thus, promisors should not be able to freely profit from 
their unilateral decision-making as to whether to comply with a contractual obligation or 
not.97 Clearly, the efficient breach theory’s creed runs counter to the long-standing pacta 
sunt servanda principle. 
Indeed, the theory has been subject to extensive criticism.98 A common critique of the 
efficient breach theory connects to the uncertainty of the transaction costs being lower 
when efficient breach is allowed.99 The theory suggests that if you allow the promisor to 
sell to a higher bidder without negotiating with the promisee beforehand about lifting the 
contractual obligation, it saves unnecessary transaction costs. However, it has been 
pointed out that it is not realistic to suggest that payment of damages in this scenario 
would not entail any transaction costs. After all, the costs of litigation from claiming and 
enforcing a relief of compensatory damages could easily out-weigh transaction costs from 
bargaining.100 
                                                
95 Eisenberg (n 62), at 570. 
96 Brooks (n 83), at 572. 
97 Id., at 572-573. 
98 See generally e.g. Daniel Friedmann, ‘The efficient breach fallacy’, (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 
1; Burrows (n 12); A S Burrows, ‘Remedies for Tort and Breach of Contract’, 3d ed. (2004); James Edel-
man, ‘Restitutionary damages and disgorgement for breach of contract’ (2000) Restitution Law Review 
129, at 145-148; Ian R. Macneil, ‘Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky’, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1982); Richard O'Dair, ‘Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach: Some Reflections’, 46 Current Legal Problems 113 (1993); Sidney DeLong, The Efficiency of a 
Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 22 IND. L. REV. 737 (1989). 
99 Efficient breach theory is based on "the implied assumption [that it] entails no transaction costs. This is, 
however, totally unrealistic.", Friedmann (n 98), at 6-7; William S. Dodge, ‘The Case for Punitive Damages 
in Contracts’, 48 Duke L.J. 629, 634 (1999) ("the transaction costs of negotiating a release are typically 
lower than the assessment costs of establishing damages at trial”). 
100 Siems (n 10), at 52. 
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Another criticism of the theory is that it is doubtful whether or not its application would 
generally lead to more efficient use of resources. This uncertainty is based on the concern 
that this kind of relaxation of contract remedies might have harmful effects on the effi-
ciency of the general contracting system. For example, if the parties could not rely on the 
promise (i.e. performance), or would fear uncompensated loss, they could end up more 
skeptical of entering into a contract from the beginning or they might face more pressure 
to participate in time-consuming, costly and inefficient negotiations about the contract 
terms.101  
Furthermore, the presumed ability of the potential contract-breaker to accurately assess 
the balance between his gains and the promisee’s loss can be questioned. In addition to 
foreseeing the costs of litigation, the contract-breaker would have to correctly assess the 
amount of loss the contract breach will cause.102 This can be seen as a factually flawed 
premise of the theory.103 Moreover, the notion that the aggrieved promisee who would 
receive expectancy damages instead of the contract subject would be ultimately and sub-
jectively indifferent with this outcome has also invited criticism.104 This relates to the 
previous point since both are linked to the promisor’s assumed ability to know exactly 
how the promisee values the contract subject.105 
A simple but profound normative argument against the efficient breach theory has been 
that economic efficiency cannot be the only principle to adhere to in contract law.106 It 
has been further argued that the theory effectively achieves to undermine the institution 
of contract as well as its promise-keeping function, and that “it strikes at the principle of 
freedom of contract and the idea of a just society. Given the choice, we would choose a 
                                                
101 Id.; Eisenberg (n 62), at 573-574. (“In addition, the theory would diminish the efficiency of the contract-
ing system. The efficiency of that system does not rest, as the theory of efficient breach implies, solely on 
legal remedies. Rather, the efficiency of the system rests on a tripod whose legs are legal remedies, repu-
tational effects, and the internalization of social norms-in particular, the moral norm of promise-keeping. 
These three legs are mutually supportive. Because all three legs are necessary to support the efficiency of 
the contracting system, anything that weakens one leg seriously threatens the efficiency of the system. The 
theory of efficient breach, if widely adopted, would do precisely that because the effect of the theory would 
be to remove the moral force of promising in a bargain context. The moral meaning of making a promise 
is to commit yourself to take a given action in the future, even if, when the action is due to be taken, all 
things considered you no longer wish to take it.”) 
102 Siems (n 10), at 52. 
103 Eisenberg (n 62), at 572. 
104 Roy Ryden Anderson, ‘The Compensatory Disgorgement Alternative to Restatement Third’s New Rem-
edy for Breach of Contract’, Southern Methodist University Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2015, at 957; 
Eisenberg (n 62), at 575, 577. 
105 Eisenberg (n 62), at 572. 
106 Adras Ltd v Harlow & Jones GmbH (1988) 42(1) PD; (1995) RLR 235 at 241 (S Levin J: “the approach 
of the economic school of law ignores in cases like this the fact that we are dealing with people with moral 
feelings and not with robots”), and 272 (Barak J: “the economic approach does not give enough weight to 
considerations which cannot be measured in economic terms”, cited in Siems (n 10), at 52 (fn 138). 
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society in which parties are encouraged to perform and not to breach their contractual 
obligations.”107 
Also, as regards the economic perspective, the significance of trust and, for example, 
correlation between trust and economic efficiency and economic growth has been estab-
lished to some extent in economic literature.108 Surely, enshrining promise-keeping as a 
value within contract law has at least some positive effects on the system’s overall effi-
ciency in the long run. 
An interesting notion about efficient breach and disgorgement is that even if allowed, in 
an isolated case, disgorgement would not have a direct effect on the phenomenon of ‘ef-
ficient breach’ per se. Instead, it would change the distribution of the benefits by way of 
granting the profit to the aggrieved promisee.109 
It can still be assumed that the availability of disgorgement, through its deterrence-effect, 
would hinder the likelihood of promisors opting out of binding contractual obligations in 
hope of accruing more plentiful gains elsewhere if they would eventually be required to 
offer those gains to the promisee. In this sense, disgorgement would still prevent the sup-
posed efficiency gains attributable to breaching according to the theory.  
What has been described as a conventional refutation110 of the said theory is that even if 
the original contract is upheld and the promisee receives the goods, in all likelihood, the 
third party who was prepared to pay more is still prepared to pay the same price and, thus, 
can buy the goods from the promisee.111 Therefore, if there would indeed be a party who 
values certain goods more than the original promisee, the goods will most probably wind 
up in the hands of the party who values them most. Also in this scenario, a corresponding 
gain to that of the ‘efficient breach’ would instead flow to the party who had already 
purchased the goods112 and there would be no litigation costs.  
Even Posner seemed to recognize implicitly that gains from a breach are likely to exceed 
the promisee’s expectation only when the subject of the contract is unique or otherwise 
                                                
107 John Rawls, ‘A Theory of Justice’ (1973), at 12, cited in: Siems (n 10), at 52-53 (fn 140), referring to 
Rawls’ theory of a just society being defined by the choice we would be most likely to make if we would 
not know what our position in that society would be. 
108 See generally Paul J. Zak and Stephen Knack, TRUST AND GROWTH, The Economic Journal, 111 
(April), 295-321. Royal Economic Society 2001. 
109 Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, ‘You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A Disgorgement Theory of 
Contract Remedies’, 52 William & Mary Law Review 1181 (2011), at 1202. (Although, also in this scenario 
the uncertainty regarding litigation costs would persist.). 
110 Id., at 1203. 
111 Friedmann (n 98), at 5. 
112 Eisenberg (n 62), at 573. 
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not available in the market.113 This is because when a widget114 is available in the market, 
the overbidding third party can get the widget from the market, just as the two original 
contracting parties can. If the third party buys from the promisor instead of the market, 
under expectancy damages rule applied in form of contract-market price differentiation, 
the promisor will effectively be required to surrender his gain from the breach. Further-
more, the widget is available in the market, the costs associated with the purchase-line of 
promisor – promisee – third party, should be significantly lower than the costs resulting 
from litigating.115  
Indeed, it has been suggested that one situation where the efficient breach theory should 
be seriously considered is when the contract subject is not available in the market. How-
ever, the subsequent notion is that the promisor is not permitted to profit here either be-
cause of the availability of specific performance. Thus, even under the system of promi-
see-based expectancy remedy, efficient breaches are likely to be rare occurrences.116 
Additionally, it has been estimated that the tension between efficient breach and disgorge-
ment remedy will unlikely concern courts when they examine the possibility of disgorge-
ment.117 During the existence of the efficient breach theory, it has been described to have 
been inhabiting almost exclusively the academic literature and law school lecture halls.118 
Practicing lawyers and judges, in turn, have been either ignoring or rejecting the theory.119 
Turning to the CISG and its presumable attitude towards the efficient breach considera-
tions, it should be noted that under the CISG’s strict policies regarding impediment and 
consequent exemption,120 the prevailing interpretation is that even a losing contract must 
be performed.121 In this sense, the Convention could be described as siding with the prin-
ciple of pacta sunt servanda. On the other hand, the damages system of the CISG, at least 
                                                
113 Posner (n 35), at 118-126, 130-131. 
114 The term ‘widget’ is often used as a neutral and generic noun about something tangible that is, or might 
be sold, in various illuminating examples of legal literature. 
115 Thel & Siegelman (n 109), at 1203-1204. 
116 Id., at 1204. 
117 Anderson (n 104), at 958. 
118 Andrew Kull, ‘Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,” and the Restatement of Contracts’, 
79 TEX. L. REV. (2001), at 2051. 
119 Craig S. Warhol, ‘Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection 
of Efficient Breach’, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. (1998) 321, at 334-340. 
120 See Art. 79 CISG. 
121 UNIDROIT Principles 2010, Article 6.2.1: “…even if a party experiences heavy losses instead of the 
expected profits or the performance has become meaningless for that party the terms of the contract must 
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in its wording, adheres to the expectation principle where specific performance can be 
awarded, but is deferred under discretionary rule based on domestic law considerations.122  
One of the interpretative principles of the CISG, namely good faith, could be seen as a 
countering force against the dominant efficiency perspective that the efficient breach the-
ory represents.123 Another related question is: what will be the CISG’s position be regard-
ing the object of deterring contract breaches at large? After all, the efficient breach theory 
is, in some sense, antithetical to the recognition of a need to deter breaches, and, instead, 
views them as something to be encouraged as long as they add to economic efficiency.124 
The CISG will be brought into the discussion later on where its damages- and interpreta-
tion doctrine will be examined in relation to these themes.  
To conclude our discussion of the efficient breach theory, it is necessary to bear in mind 
as a general rule that even when an opposing argument against a theory could be repudi-
ated, that alone might not indicate much of anything about the validity of the opposed 
theory itself. There has been a considerable amount of criticism towards accepting dis-
gorgement in contract law that is not based on economic efficiency perspectives, but ra-
ther on the need to preserve the cohesion and functionality of contract damages system 
and on the hazardousness of excessive emphasis on moral condemnation in contract law. 
3.3 Corrective Justice and Disgorgement 
 
This chapter is meant to further elaborate and broaden the theoretical framework in which 
the availability of disgorgement has been evaluated. In particular, it will introduce some 
of the viewpoints the corrective justice theory, in private law, has produced attempting to 
explain disgorgement and its possible shortcomings.  
Corrective justice is a school of thought that has provided principled viewpoints on our 
subject and it offers a useful tool for evaluating disgorgement because it does not stem 
from any specific legal system125 but instead examines the deeper structures behind dif-
ferent legal remedies.  According to corrective justice, the normative structure of private 
                                                
122 See Art. 28 CISG. 
123 Perhaps a bit ironically, both efficient breach and disgorgement, even though pointing in opposite direc-
tions when it comes to contract damages, might be subjected to some form of bias due to their somewhat 
foreign background in legal cultures outside American common law when applying the CISG. 
124 Temple (n 19), at 94. 
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law entails that remedies achieve their justification by their quality of correcting a wrong 
perpetrated by a defendant and suffered by a claimant.126  
The philosophical roots of this theory reach into the ideas of Aristotle himself,127 pre-
sented in Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle argued that corrective justice is only con-
cerned with “rectification in transactions” between persons128 i.e. that the disturbance of 
status quo needs to be reinstated.129 Thus, corrective justice demands the undoing of an 
injustice, something which wrongful gains, as well as the harm to the aggrieved party, 
could be construed as. The theory of corrective justice links the nature of breaching one’s 
duty and the consequential violation of another’s right inseparably as a phenomenon. The 
aggrieved party’s loss can be seen as attributable to the wrongdoer’s gain and vice 
versa.130 
This bipolarity of the theory also partly explains why different takes on the theory’s 
proper interpretation in the context of private law have led to it being invoked both for 
and against the applicability of disgorgement. On one hand, a principled connection be-
tween gains acquired through a breach and the injured party’s loss might be a tempting 
starting point for construing the gains as an indicator of injustice, albeit challenging to 
prove in practical terms. On the other hand, the opposite can also be argued: that the non-
existence of observable loss could serve as an indicator of the absence of injustice de-
manding rectification.  
The remedial aspect of corrective justice has been described in the following manner by 
Ernest Weinrib: “…remedy corrects the injustice suffered by the plaintiff at the defend-
ant’s hand.”.131 Under the corrective justice theory, the connection between a right and a 
remedy is an intimate one. It views the claimant’s right and the defendant’s correlative 
                                                
126 See Botterell (n 14), at 137-138; Ernest Weinrib, ‘Restitutionary Remedies as Corrective Justice’ (2000) 
1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1-37, at 4. 
127 Weinrib (n 126), at 37: ”Drawing on Aristotle, the theory of corrective justice locates the structure of 
these norms in the correlativity of doing and suffering. Drawing on Kant and Hegel, the theory locates 
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128 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Translation. Irwin trans., Hackett, 1985), cited in: Botterell (n 14), at 
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129 Siems (n 10), at 43. 
130 Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 Duke Law Journal 277-297 (1994), 
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duty as the building blocks of the normative relationship between the parties. As for mon-
etary damages, they are essentially an attempt of private law to rectify the defendant’s 
violation of the claimant’s right in terms of money.  
In corrective justice, the nature of the right and its counterpart of a duty are said to also 
determine the nature of the remedy. Along these lines, broader policy considerations that 
are outside of the parties’ relationship should play no role.132 It flows from this that com-
pensatory damages fall within the principles of corrective justice as long as they are able 
to remedy the aggrieved right of the claimant. Disgorgement, in turn, can be seen as ques-
tionable, if it has objectives situated outside the claimant’s right.133 
Corrective justice also entails that the liability of a certain defendant is necessarily a lia-
bility to a certain claimant. This is in line with the principled notion that the parties are 
not to be considered as entirely independent actors in the eyes of the law, but rather as the 
one who inflicts and the one who receives the same injustice. Thus, the remedy should 
mirror, as a response, the correlatively structured injustice. A reason for considering the 
breaching party to have caused injustice should also be the reason to consider that the 
claimant has suffered injustice. This can also be seen as the logical continuum for the 
‘right and obligation’ dichotomy, which is perhaps more well-known in general.134 
What corrective justice and disgorgement do have in common is the idea that profiting 
from a breach of contract is a ‘wrong’. The problem with reconciling these concepts is 
that it is not as self-evident that the gains targeted via disgorgement are something to 
which the claimant has the better right. Furthermore, it has been argued that for disgorge-
ment to be a corrective justice remedy the claimant should have some normative entitle-
ment to said gains in order for the remedy to rectify a wrong caused by the actions of the 
defendant.135 
From the perspective of corrective justice, what makes this issue perhaps a bit less prob-
lematic regarding the legitimacy of disgorgement as a contract law remedy is the notion 
that in some cases of expectation damages, the above-mentioned normative entitlement 
                                                
132 See id., at 61, 103; Weinrib (n 126), at 37: “Purposes such as punishment or deterrence (or broader 
purposes such as the promotion of economic efficiency or of other goods), even if they otherwise seem de-
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have so brilliantly obscured private law.”. 
133 Weinrib (n 50), at 57. 
134 Id., at 59-60. 
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might also be dubious, and thus, disgorgement might not be any more problematic from 
the perspective of corrective justice than expectation damages are in some circum-
stances.136 
Nevertheless, in many cases where disgorgement has been awarded,137 it has been done 
regardless of the fact that there was not a discernable loss on the side of the claimant 
reflecting the gain of the defendant. This is the issue that makes disgorgement as a remedy 
‘puzzling’ from the viewpoint of corrective justice.138 
One further issue that has also been addressed in corrective justice is the nature of the 
contractual performance as what is owed due to the contract: is it an action or a particular 
thing? The conclusions regarding disgorgement’s place within the corrective justice can 
be viewed as two-fold relating to this question.  
First, there is the view that when the promisee has contracted for unique or non-generic 
goods, he or she can be seen as entitled to the profits obtained by the promisor via selling 
the contracted-for unique goods to a higher bidder due to a proprietary interest attached 
to the specific goods.139 Weinrib ponders about this perspective:  
 “So far as corrective justice is concerned, disgorgement is an appropriate 
 remedy when the defendant wrongfully alienates something to which the 
 plaintiff had a proprietary right. By virtue of ownership the owner is entitled 
 to all the profits that accrue from the alienation of what is owned.”.140 
Because of the conception of contracts as vehicles for making promises to the effect that 
what one owes under a contract is an action to deliver a widget instead of the widget itself, 
it is problematic to derive the right to disgorgement by construing a proprietary right into 
a contract which had only promised an action. In other words, a contract generates only 
a personal claim to the promising party’s performance and, thus, there is no direct link 
between contractual entitlement and proprietary right.141 
Botterell is of a different opinion and argues from the perspective of corrective justice 
that “when an action or performance contracted for is particular, disgorgement will be 
                                                
136 Botterell (n 14), at 141. 
137 See British Motor Trade Ass’n v. Gilbert, [1951] 2 All E.R. 641; Hickey & Co., Ltd. v. Roches Stores 
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available”.142 Botterell basically sees a contractual promise including the implicit prom-
ise not to breach, and thus “nothing stands in the way of viewing disgorgement damages 
as a form of compensatory damages…. because disgorgement damages seek to put 
the…promisee in the position she would have been in had she…received what she was 
promised and so was entitled to…”.143 
To conclude this subchapter, it can be noted that the corrective justice theory has been 
interpreted in both ways: as complying with the idea of disgorgement and being incon-
sistent with it. What could be inferred from the theory is that both sides of these differing 
views clearly attach some significance to the question of whether the contracted-for goods 
are unique or generally available at the marketplace. This, in turn, is mostly due to issues 
of inadequacy of monetary damages and the proprietary interest in a specific object. 
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143 Id., at 158. 
32 
 
4. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
 
This chapter will deal with perhaps the articulated acceptance of disgorgement in contract 
law and the discourse around this specific occurrence. This part of the thesis represents 
the comparative perspective and intends to introduce recent developments in the U.S. 
contract law regarding disgorgement for readers primarily interested in the CISG.  
4.1 The Restatements of Law: A Brief Overview 
 
Restatements of law are a special part of the doctrinal landscape of the U.S. legal system 
and they are issued by the American Law Institute (ALI) to help compose the currently 
applicable legal doctrine of a specific field of law ranging from employment law to the 
law of international commercial arbitration. The goal of a restatement is, in essence, the 
clarification and simplification of the U.S. common law, as well as its adaptation to soci-
etal changes.144 
The American Law Institute was established in 1923 and the members of ALI are com-
posed of law professors, attorneys, judges and other legal professionals. Courts and leg-
islatures in the U.S. regularly take ALI’s restatements as authoritative reference material 
in different legal issues.145 
ALI’s method in addressing the problem of looming dangers to uniformity of law, by the 
diversity of growing body of a certain field of the U.S. common law, was to produce an 
unofficial but authoritative summary of the substance of jurisprudence in an area or 
branch of the law. Subsequently, the institute put forward a plan to write these Restate-
ments of law by appointing ‘Reporters’, who were typically leading academic experts in 
a given field of law that was to be restated, as well as advisers from all three branches of 
the legal profession.146 
The classical structure of a restatement of law is composed of propositions of law, ex-
planatory commentary and a set of enlightening illustrations from the reported case law. 
The main function of the Restatements was to accurately summarize the existing law, but 
it was originally accepted as well that the Restatements could “promote those changes 
                                                
144 “ALI drafts, discusses, revises, and publishes Restatements of the Law, Model Codes, and Principles of 
Law that are enormously influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal scholarship and 
education.”, at:  https://www.ali.org/about-ali/. 
145 McCamus (n 29), at 440-441. 
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which will tend better to adapt the law to the needs of life” with the caveat that such 
proposals of modification should be generally accepted as beneficial.147  
In any case, the essential objective of the Restatements was to restate rather than reform 
the existing law and it has been estimated that this function, in particular, has led to the 
recognition of the Restatements as authoritative reports of the existing law.148 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the process to create a new restatement of law is that 
the whole membership of the ALI (consisting of some three thousand lawyers) must ap-
prove the tentative draft produced by the reporter:  
 “…the black letter will be presented, section by section, to a room of 
 hundreds of lawyers, any one of whom has standing to intervene and raise
 questions on anything from the substantive rule that is proposed to the 
 choice of words or punctuation in the draft. Not surprisingly, the  
 production of the whole document takes years, but the result is that when 
 it is complete, it has the authority that comes from the successful  
 negotiation of this complex procedure.”149 
4.2 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
 
The final Council Draft of the Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
(R3RUE)150 was approved on May 12, 2010, and the final edited version of the Restate-
ment was published by ALI a year later. The entire process of creating the R3RUE lasted 
fifteen years.151 
To briefly lay out the appropriate context, the reader should acknowledge the broader 
substance of the R3RUE. It covers the U.S. legal rules on topics such as payments made 
by mistake, under duress, via transactions deemed ineffective by different doctrines of 
common law and also the recovery of benefits obtained through tortious- or another kind 
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of wrongdoing.152 The R3RUE does not segregate the different remedies or doctrines on 
the basis of their respective roots being in law or in equity.153 
The doctrine of the R3RUE is that it describes the law of restitution in general as the law 
governing circumstances in which a person is deemed liable for received benefits and in 
which the liability is measured by the extent of the benefit.154 The first type of restitution 
consists of the recovery of mistakenly paid money and other instances of unjust enrich-
ment. The second type of restitution of benefits (and the one this thesis is interested in) is 
where the benefit is not acquired directly from the promisee but from third parties by 
breach of a certain duty owed to the promisee.  
An example of this type of restitutionary obligation is where a fiduciary abuses its duty 
towards the beneficiary by engaging in profitable dealings with third parties and as a 
consequence is ordered to disgorge these profits. Disgorgement is necessary in order to 
prevent the fiduciary’s ‘unjust enrichment’ under the R3RUE.155 
Restitution claims in general (including those for disgorgement) share the central function 
of preventing “the defendant’s unjust enrichment by recapturing the gains the defendant 
secured in a transaction.”156 Thus, restitution measures the defendant’s gain after which 
it requires him or her to disgorge a sum equal to the gains which can be traced back to the 
transaction or wrongdoing in question.157  
Undoubtedly, the most groundbreaking clarification of the applicable restitution doctrine 
in the new Restatement is the limited, but explicit, approval of disgorgement for breach 
of contract.158 It is necessary to note that the reporter of the R3RUE himself estimated that 
these cases would be rare.159  The rule laid out in § 39 R3RUE, which stipulates disgorge-
ment as applicable in some cases of breach of contract, has been described as “daring” 
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but also as “one of the Restatement’s major contributions to and clarifications of the 
law”.160 
On the part of disgorgement for breach of contract, as has been touched upon above, it is 
not always obvious from the surface whether the situation is of the kind that the benefit 
has been obtained at the expense of another in circumstances where the claimant itself 
could not have obtained the benefit in question. The R3RUE provides the following clar-
ification on this matter: 
 “While the paradigm case of unjust enrichment is one in which the benefit 
 on one side of the transaction corresponds to an observable loss on the 
 other, the consecrated formula ‘at the expense of another’ can also mean 
 ‘in violation of the other’s legally protected rights,’ without the need to 
 show that the claimant has suffered a loss.”.161 
The R3RUE also states the general principle underlying disgorgement in the following 
manner: “A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.”162 This principle, that 
people should not be allowed to profit by wrongdoing and its significance is affirmed in 
other parts of the Restatement as well.163  
Rather boldly, the R3RUE does not shy away from stating its stance in clear terms on the 
fundamental issue of disgorgement’s contradictory nature in relation to the full compen-
sation principle164 as it advocates that the doctrine of restitution should permit a claimant’s 
recovery of “more than a provable loss so that the defendant may be stripped of a wrong-
ful gain.”165 It also clarifies that in allowing disgorgement the deterrence effect is sought 
after as well.166 Disgorgement’s function of deterring opportunistic breaches is also rec-
ognized elsewhere.167  
                                                
160 Smith (n 149), at 633 and Michael Traynor, ‘The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrich-
ment: Some Introductory Suggestions’, Washington and Lee Law Review (2011) Vol. 68, 899-910, at 902. 
161 R3RUE, at 3. 
162 Id. § 3. 
163 Id. §§ 40-44. 
164 James S. Rogers. ‘Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution.’ Wake 
Forest Law Review 42, (2007): 55-91, at 66: “On balance, the law is better if it is openly acknowledged 
that in some extreme cases a person ought not be able to profit from breach of contract, even if that notion 
is in tension with much of what underlies contract law.”. 
165 R3RUE, § 3 cmt. a. 
166 Id. § 3 cmt. c, “Restitution requires full disgorgement of profit by a conscious wrongdoer ... because 
any lesser liability would provide an inadequate incentive to lawful behavior.”. 
167 See Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of Contract, 77 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 991, 995 (2009); see also Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515 (stating that disgorgement is a reliable 
deterrent to breach). 
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To the extent to which disgorgement would manifest in overcompensation for the claim-
ant, it is still not regarded as punitive, at least within the confines of the common law 
terminology.168 This is because even if disgorgement would constitute more than com-
pensation to the claimant, it would not be more than what the defendant gained and there-
fore would not be punitive in nature.169 
One commentator sees the party claiming for disgorgement as “society’s representative, 
similar to a private attorney general, to deprive the promisor of his ill-gotten gain and to 
uphold the legal and moral objective that promises are meant to be kept and not bro-
ken.”.170 Indeed, the principle that promises must be kept can be waved as an argument 
in favor of disgorgement as the remedy is said to give “teeth to the long-standing case 
law principle” of pacta sunt servanda (i.e. that promises are to be kept).171  
It is worth noting that the R3RUE, by way of citing existing case law and subsuming that 
into a carefully crafted rule, is suggesting that disgorgement can and should be granted 
by the courts on the basis of the law as it is today.172 Also, in the doctrine of the R3RUE, 
instead of a claim of unjust enrichment the claim for disgorgement is rather a contractual 
claim for a special measure of damages; a claim for restitution arising from a contract 
rather than avoidance.173 
4.3 Disgorgement as Prescribed in the R3RUE 
 
The black letter text of the R3RUE, which provides the rule for disgorgement in breach 
of contract cases is situated under the chapter “Restitution and Contract” and further 
therein under the topic “Alternative Remedies for Breach of an Enforceable Contract”. 
The specific provision (§ 39) is titled as (and in its entirety):  
Profit From Opportunistic Breach. 
 (1) If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting prom-
isor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate protection to the promisee's 
contractual entitlement, the promisee has a claim to restitution of the profit realized by 
                                                
168 R3RUE, § 51 cmt. k (“Disgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive remedy.”). 
169 Dobbs (n 54), at 567; Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, ‘Law and Economics’ (3d ed. 2000), at 234, cited 
in: Eisenberg (n 62), at 561 (fn 3): (“‘[P]erfect disgorgement’ is ‘a sanction that restores the wrongdoer 
to the same position that she would have been in but for the wrong’ and thus ‘strips the agent of her gain 
from misappropriation and leaves her no better or worse than if she had done no wrong.’”). 
170 Feldman (n 153), at 466. 
171 Weinrib (n 50), at 73. 
172 Lionel Smith, Legal Epistemology in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 
Boston University Law Review [Vol. 92:899 2012], at 901-902. 
173 R3RUE, §37 (introductory note), § 38 cmt a.  
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the promisor as a result of the breach. Restitution by the rule of this section is an alter-
native to a remedy in damages. 
 (2) A case in which damages afford inadequate protection to the promisee's 
contractual entitlement is ordinarily one in which damages will not permit the promisee 
to acquire a full equivalent to the promised performance in a substitute transaction. 
 (3) Breach of contract is profitable when it results in gains to the defendant 
(net of potential liability in damages) greater than the defendant would have realized 
from performance of the contract. Profits from breach include saved expenditure and 
consequential gains that the defendant would not have realized but for the breach, as 
measured by the rules that apply in other cases of disgorgement (§ 51(5)).174 
We can see that § 39 R3RUE sets out three subsections of which the first (1) lays out the 
basic function of the remedy, the second (2) elaborates when ordinary damages are 
deemed inadequate and the third (3) explains when a breach of contract actually is prof-
itable. 
The explanatory comments provided in the R3RUE state that the remedy should be re-
served for ‘exceptional cases’, where a profitable breach can be seen as a source of unjust 
enrichment at the expense of the other party.175 It goes on to say that the U.S law of resti-
tution, as it currently stands and should be interpreted, “treats such cases in the same way 
that it treats other instances of intentional and profitable interference with another per-
son’s legally protected interests” by providing an alternative remedy for breach.176 
The comments explaining § 39 of R3RUE also tackle the issue of possible overcompen-
sation as a result of disgorgement. It is admitted that a remedy that exceeds the claimant’s 
provable losses is anomalous when judged by the usual presumptions of contract law 
because irrespective of the contract-breakers’ motivations, a breach of contract is not gen-
erally regarded as a wrong comparable to a tort or breach of fiduciary duty. The Reporter 
makes the case that while contractual entitlements may often be relatively easy to value, 
they too would be vulnerable to risks of under-enforcement if the sole remedy for a breach 
would be a claim for monetary damages.177 
Therefore, when damages provide inadequate protection, courts can guarantee the protec-
tion of the injured party by ordering an injunction or specific performance. In essence, 
                                                
174 R3RUE, § 39. 





the R3RUE’s argument is that restitution in form of disgorgement can provide compara-
ble ‘after the fact’ protection by awarding the gains from a profitable breach of contract, 
which the defendant can no longer be made to perform.178 
The concept of ‘opportunistic breach’ refers to situations where a promisor recognizes 
that the promisee’s position is vulnerable to abuse and attempts to profit from this. One 
example is that the promisor realizes that the promisee would face difficulties trying to 
recover a full equivalent of the performance through compensatory damages. It is said 
that the mere possibility of allowing this scenario to unfold without a response would 
undermine the stability of contractual exchange where one party’s performance is hard 
to compel or to value. The label ‘opportunistic’ explains why the breach is condemned, 
but there is no requirement that the claimant proves the motivation of the breaching 
party.179 
The rule of § 39 is meant to reinforce the position of the ‘vulnerable’ party and to con-
demn conscious attempts to take advantage of the situation. It also extends an analogous 
protection to certain contract rights that are guaranteed when proprietary interests are in-
volved. This is explained by stating that the vulnerable positions mentioned are those in 
which the promisee would usually be protected by specific performance, or in which par-
ties would often prepare by agreeing upon liquidated damages or specific enforceability. 
Disgorgement, in § 39, serves the same function of reinforcing a contract, but only at a 
different stage of the contractual relationship.180 
Another prerequisite for disgorgement pursuant to § 39 is the inadequacy of compensa-
tory damages for protecting the promisee’s contractual entitlement. This means that if the 
contractual entitlement of the promisee is adequately compensated by an award of dam-
ages, there is no claim for disgorgement as “there is no remedial vulnerability to be ex-
ploited, no opportunism, and no unjust enrichment”. According to the R3RUE, the ade-
quacy of damages is to be determined by the court applying the governing law to its own 
understanding through case by case analysis. However, § 39(2) provides the baseline 
standard for this estimation.181 
The R3RUE suggests that one way to examine the adequacy component in potential dis-
gorgement cases is to perform a hypothetical test for the availability of specific relief. If, 
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in hindsight, there would have been grounds for granting an injunction or specific perfor-
mance, restitution in the form of disgorgement could be appropriate after the fact. Dis-
gorgement, in this sense, could bring about a remedial equivalent by putting the breaching 
party to the position the legitimately enforced adherence to contractual performance 
would have produced.182 
However, the R3RUE particularizes that even though the parallels between specific per-
formance and disgorgement can be helpful in this examination, use of the parallels cannot 
serve as a decisive test. In fact, disgorgement would be appropriate in many cases where 
specific performance would not have been granted because specific performance can be 
denied for reasons that do not relate to adequacy considerations such as impracticability, 
difficulties in enforcing the award and/or reasonability perspectives.183 
The explanatory comments further clarify that also in contexts other than where specific 
reliefs would have been available, disgorgement could be justified.  The following exam-
ple is given:  
“[A] promise not to disclose or utilize confidential information is the usual 
form by which trade secrets are protected; allowing restitution for breach 
of the contract is equivalent to restitution for misappropriation of the trade 
secret. Again, if one party's contractual obligation to another has a fiduci-
ary or confidential character, disgorgement for breach of the contract 
might be justified by observing that it resembles a liability to account for 
profits derived from a breach of fiduciary duty.”184 
The comments take a clear-cut stance on the issue whether disgorgement is punitive: as 
it is stated that while the rule intends to make breach unprofitable, it does not seek to 
punish the breaching party as it, for instance, does not require the forfeiture of defendant’s 
entire profit from the transaction made in violation of the claimant’s rights.185 
The Reporter is also straightforward about disgorgement being the least frequently ap-
plied of the available remedies for breach of contract. This is apparently so because the 
                                                
182 Id. 
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can be seen as flowing from specific and separate merit of the defendant. 
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cumulative requirements set out in § 39 typically exclude a great majority of cases in-
volving a breach of contract.  
Firstly, the requirement of the breach being profitable eliminates most breaches from the 
consideration.186 Secondly, the requirement that the breach was made deliberately rules 
out cases of negligence and unsuccessful attempts to perform, which restricts the scope 
of disgorgement under § 39.187 Thirdly, even if the breach would be deemed profitable 
and deliberate as a product of conscious choice, there is no claim under § 39 as long as 
compensatory damages would ensure adequate protection to claimant’s contractual enti-
tlement.188 
4.4 Reception in Legal Literature 
 
The R3RUE is described as an impressive doctrinal presentation of the law of restitution 
as a whole, and it has received praise from scholars as a comprehensive and influential 
compaction of this particular field of law.189 Furthermore, it is predicted to shape the 
broader understanding of restitution even beyond the U.S.190 The R3RUE is seen as being 
situated in an interpretative tradition of not only the common law, but also the civil law.191 
Notably, the substantive approach of § 39 has specifically been well-received.192 
It has been pointed out that, even though § 39 has been presented with words of limitation, 
the rationale underlying the rule is quite broad and therefore notwithstanding the narrow 
construction of the rule, it has been implied that its “implications may be sweeping”. The 
same broad rationale is suspected to make disgorgement’s proposed function of reinforc-
ing contracts a difficult task.193   
The major argument of the R3RUE is that disgorgement has a legitimate place within the 
existing remedial framework of the U.S. contract law. This view of disgorgement is 
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largely accepted among commentators194 and indeed, the U.S courts have applied the rem-
edy in various cases.195 
4.5 Critique Towards § 39 R3RUE 
 
This subsection will summarize some critical points directed towards the disgorgement 
rule of the R3RUE. Perhaps the most thorough critique has been put forward by David 
Campbell in the article: A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution § 
39. The content provided therein is sufficiently comprehensive for the purpose of this 
section.196  
The essential dispute between those who welcome disgorgement as a viable - although 
limitedly deployed - remedy and those who reject it, is whether a breach of contract 
should be regarded as a ‘wrong’ in and of itself. The criticism of compensatory damages 
is, in the end, that damages are unable to prevent immoral or amoral contracting behavior 
of schematic importance and consequently demands disgorgement as an alternative in 
cases of ‘opportunistic breach’.197 
Campbell, however, claims that expectation-based remedies sufficiently accommodate 
moral positions by way of encouraging cooperation to deal with the consequences of the 
breach compared to the wider availability of restitutionary damages which would render 
“unbalanced and indefensible power to the plaintiff to vindicate his formal rights”. He 
argues that because this recent development in contract law conflicts with the freedom of 
contract in such a way that it cannot be established without endangering that freedom, the 
disgorgement of the R3RUE “has no chance whatsoever of becoming settled law”.198  
                                                
194 Eisenberg (n 62), at 559-562; Thel & Siegelman (n 109), at 1181; Ronald Israel & Brian O’Neill, Dis-
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Campbell also criticizes the R3RUE’s somewhat categorical rejection of efficient 
breaches by referring to both courts’ reasoning in the Blake case, which intended to re-
strict disgorgement to not to be used in preventing efficient breach199 (similarly in an ar-
bitral award).200 He makes the case that should disgorgement be available as an alternative 
to expectation damages for every breach, contract law would be transformed in an “ut-
terly chaotic manner”.201 
In Campbell’s representation, the system of contract remedies must balance two compet-
ing goals: 1) securing the injured party’s benefit of the bargain, but 2) without imposing 
unnecessary costs on the breaching party.202 To put it briefly, compensatory damages are 
based on combining the principle of expectation (interest) damages and achieving that 
without undue burden on the defendant. According to Campbell, the existing balance 
would face ever-growing instability were disgorgement to be established as a contractual 
remedy.203 
In summary, in Campbell’s eyes the root problem of the current somewhat confused state 
of contractual remedies in the form of the dissatisfaction for expectancy damages is the 
“excessively literal belief in pacta sunt servanda”. Ultimately, contracting parties need 
to understand what they are doing when contracting, and this, in turn, would require them 
to abandon their literal belief in pacta sunt servanda.204 
Roy Anderson is of the view that the support in case law for the new rule of § 39 is not as 
clear as some suggest it to be, and he locates the true problem in contract remedies’ omis-
sion of compensating non-pecuniary losses. For Anderson, “An apportionment of profits 
is the appropriate remedy, up to full disgorgement in extreme cases.”. He calls for a 
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wider, compensation-based approach, instead of “the punishment-based, full disgorge-
ment remedy that is proffered by the new Restatement of Restitution”.  
According to Anderson, when a breach has caused an obvious loss by infringing a con-
tractual entitlement or by depriving it altogether, courts typically have no pecuniary index 
to value the promisee’s loss but when the promisor directly profits from his violation that 
profit provides the needed pecuniary index with which to measure the loss much like 
courts have long done for infringements of intellectual property. 205 
4.6 Summary of the R3RUE’s Disgorgement and Its Context 
 
To summarize this chapter, the requirements for disgorgement as prescribed in the 
R3RUE are as follows: that the profitable contract breach must be deliberate in that it 
represents opportunistic behavior, and that expectancy damages fail to provide adequate 
protection for the bargained contractual entitlement of the promisee.  
For the purposes of this thesis and to highlight the underpinnings of R3RUE’s disgorge-
ment, the key principles behind the growing approval of the viewpoint of the R3RUE’s 
rule should be noted. I would argue that these are: the fundamental need to uphold the 
principles related to promise-keeping, and that one should not be allowed to benefit from 
one’s wrong, not even in a contractual context.  
As we have witnessed, some argue that this approach is necessary, as it is resolute in 
substituting the unsatisfactory half-measure that prioritizes the appeasement of the func-
tioning of the broader system of contract damages with an uncompromising full-measure 
that ensures justice in unusual cases. Their perspective appears to be that should contract 
law fail to address certain cardinal cases, this could undermine the core-values of the 
broader system. Others, in turn, contend that the remedy of disgorgement is too uncom-
promising and that its proponents simply represent a too literal understanding of the pacta 
sunt servanda principle. 
However, as the principles in question are, to a great extent, universal, we are able to 
proceed to the CISG -discussion of this thesis. We will examine how some of the related 
issues, especially the good faith principle, have been evaluated under the CISG and 
whether there exists a possibility of arriving at similar conclusions, which have been 
reached in the U.S. and, to some extent, elsewhere as well. 
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5. Relevant Remedial Provisions of the CISG 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to introduce the basic damages doctrine of 
the CISG. Also, the material provision stipulating restitution (Art. 84 CISG) will be dis-
cussed. Due to the emphasis placed on the part of the analysis concerning the underlying 
principles of the Convention, this chapter will be largely limited to presenting the provi-
sional framework within which this issue will necessarily play out.  
5.1 Article 74 CISG – the General Damages Provision 
 
The right to claim damages for buyer and seller is stipulated in Art. 45(1) b and Art. 61(1) 
b respectively. Both provisions are based on strict liability as they do not require any fault 
of the breaching party. The CISG also allows the parties to claim specific performance 
and gives the right to treat the contract as avoided and subsequently claim restitution. Art. 
74 is the provision governing the scope of damages for breach of contract under the CISG. 
It reads as follows: 
 Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the 
 loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence 
 of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in 
 breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of 
 the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or 
 ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. 
The Secretariat Commentary on Art. 74206 states that the article lays out the rule concern-
ing damages by outlining the basic rule for the calculation of damages, and that the fol-
lowing articles (Arts. 75-76 CISG) implement this basic rule by ”providing the means of 
calculating damages in certain defined cases when the contract has been avoided”.207 In 
practice, Art. 74 is the provision that applies in cases where the contract has not been 
avoided or where there is still losses left uncompensated, even after the application of 
Art. 75 or 76. 
                                                
206 Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft, (which is “perhaps the most authoritative source one can 
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70). 
207 Id., at para 1.  
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The Secretariat Commentary’s language is clear in that it explains the execution of the 
expectation principle as the primary function of Art. 74 CISG.208 The underlining princi-
ple contained in Art. 74 is the full compensation principle.209 The full compensation prin-
ciple is conventionally seen also entailing the rule that the injured party must not be over-
compensated as a result of the awarded damages.210 
As Art. 74 is the general damages provision in the sense that it is intended to cover all the 
various situations, it does not lay out specific rules describing the method of determining 
the “loss suffered …. as a consequence of the breach”. Instead, courts and arbitral tribu-
nals must decide what the most suitable method is for the calculation of loss in each 
case.211  
This speaks for a liberal interpretation of the provision’s functionality. In essence, no 
calculation should be prima facie excluded, as long as it fits within the overall objective 
to place the injured party in the position that it would have been in without the breach.212 
The second part of Art. 74 makes an important limitation to the right to claim damages 
through the foreseeability requirement. The principle of limiting the recoverable loss to 
the extent to which the loss was reasonably foreseeable to the breaching party can be 
found in most legal systems.213 Essentially, the rule serves to exclude causalities that are 
too remote from the scope of recoverable damages. 
Another limiting requirement for recovering damages under the CISG comes from Art. 
77, which sets a duty to mitigate loss upon the injured party.214 The provision stipulates 
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that the injured party must take action to minimize the losses caused by a breach. The 
injured party is precluded from remaining indifferent and idle in the aftermath of a breach 
while expecting the breaching party to pay damages for all losses that accrue. This duty 
has been described as “perhaps the most important qualification on an injured party’s 
recovery of damages”.215 
To return to Art. 74, while its reflectiveness of the expectation principle is acknowledged, 
the provision’s lack of detail leaves gaps inviting further interpretation.216 The CISG Ad-
visory Council Opinion No. 6 has made several clarifications in this regard. An important 
question is the burden of proof, which is placed on the injured party, who has to prove 
with reasonable certainty that it has suffered loss and the extent of that loss, although not 
with ‘mathematical precision’.217 This leeway is much required in cases in which the 
breaching party should not be able to escape liability simply because of difficulties in 
providing unquestionable proof of the loss. Instead, reasonable certainty is required.218 
According to Advisory Council’s Opinion No. 6, Art. 74 does not allow the awarding of 
punitive damages simply because the wording of the article prescribes the sum of dam-
ages to be equal to the loss. However, the said Opinion also attaches the motivation to 
punish onto its qualification of punitive damages.219 
5.2 Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Article 74 
 
Although, the wording of Art. 74, its rootedness in the expectation principle, natural lim-
itations of the full compensation principle, and the orthodox viewpoint all tend to restrict 
the interpretation of CISG’s damages rule to the effect of excluding disgorgement of prof-
its from the Convention’s legal praxis, there are viewpoints suggesting that the prevailing 
interpretation is not as settled as one might think. There are different emphases on differ-
ent principles of the CISG that render this subject worthy of deeper examination. This 
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216 Id., at 268. 
217 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, at 2. 
218 Id., at comment 3.13. 
219 Id., at 9 B, 9.5, ”The Convention does not provide for the payment of punitive damages. Punitive dam-
ages, also called exemplary damages, are sums awarded in excess of any compensatory or nominal dam-
ages in order to punish a party for outrageous misconduct.”. See also Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow, 
‘International Sales Law’, Oceana Publications, 1992, at 299; Peter Huber & Alastair Mullis, The CISG: A 




subchapter intends to summarize some of these points in order to provide a complete 
perspective on the interpretation of Art. 74. 
Ingeborg Schwenzer, while stating that an actual claim for disgorgement cannot be drawn 
from Art. 74, is of the opinion that “benefits which the promisor obtains from his breach 
of contract may be taken into account when calculating and assessing damages.” and 
that “the notion that the promisee must not be overcompensated cannot strictly be applied 
in the context of the Convention either”.220  
Schwenzer also recognizes the pull for accepting disgorgement of profits in domestic le-
gal systems.221 On the issue of the closely related question regarding the ‘paramount’ per-
formance principle’s growing affirmation in domestic legal systems222, she states:  
 “[T]his changed perception in domestic legal systems needs to be  
 reflected when interpreting the Convention. Such developments must be 
 taken into account in order to prevent courts from feeling the need to 
 apply domestic law in addition to the Convention. This would undermine 
 unification in a core area.”223 
Furthermore, Schwenzer asserts that the performance principle’s impact on the interpre-
tation of the CISG is that “the general idea that a breach of contract must not pay also 
has to be upheld under the Convention”.224 
Finally, in her analysis of disgorgement under the CISG, Schwenzer makes the case that 
“targeting the profits of the promisor is possible and necessary”, for example in a situa-
tion where “the seller sells the goods a second time and realizes a higher profit than 
agreed to under the contract with the first buyer”.225  
                                                
220 Schwenzer (n 209), at 1002. Interestingly, while evaluating this question Shcwenzer also states that 
“penal elements can also play a role despite the fact that the Convention does not allow awarding punitive 
damages”. However, she still acknowledges that the view that Article 74 CISG does not allow disgorge-
ment of profits is the “currently general agreement amongst German authors”, id., at 1017.  
221 Id., at 1017. 
222 Id., at 1001, ”As in domestic legal systems, the claim for damages is primarily directed at compensation. 
Additionally, however, today there is an increasing emphasis on the preventive role of damages. This is 
accompanied by a shift of focus in regard to contract damages from purely mathematical economic benefits 
to the interest of the promisee in performance as required by the contract (‘performance principle’).” 
223 Id., at 1001. 
224 Id., at 1017. However, Schwenzer adds that ”there are likely to be few cases in the international sale of 
goods in which the promisee has suffered no loss whatsoever while the promisor was able to make a profit.” 
225 Id. (The other circumstances where disgorgement might be appropriate according to Schwenzer are 
where ”the seller, who is contractually obliged to manufacture the goods under humane and environmen-
tally friendly conditions, lowers his production costs by resorting to production mechanisms which are in 
breach of the agreement, thereby increasing his profit” and where ”Against an express stipulation in the 
contract the buyer supplies the European market with the goods purchased and makes according profits”.) 
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Leaving little doubt of her, albeit limited, acceptance of disgorgement’s potential applica-
bility under the CISG in certain circumstances, Schwenzer states that “the performance 
principle demands that the profits the promisor has obtained as a result of his breach of 
contract be disgorged.”. This statement is softened by the assertion that the suggested 
limited deployment of disgorgement remedy could be also viewed as a calculation method 
for the damages in cases where damages would be otherwise difficult or even impossible 
to prove.226 
It is fair to say that Schwenzer leaves the reader slightly puzzled. She seems to emphasize 
perspectives that are not generally recognized as significant as Schwenzer depicts them 
to be. Although Schwenzer is regarded as one of the leading scholars on the CISG, it 
would be ill-advised and also naïve to instantly assume that this appreciation should au-
tomatically extend to the particular views referenced above. 
However, it should not be overlooked that one specific argument Schwenzer presents 
deals with the comparative perspective, as the recent developments in domestic legal sys-
tems is highlighted as a crucial issue. The concern is that the CISG might eventually 
become irrelevant if it is unable to adapt to significant changes in domestic legal systems. 
In any case, I would contend that the development of value-based arguments flowing 
from an undercurrent of different legal principles227 is conceivable to anyone who is cu-
rious enough to adopt a more schematic perspective and notice the apparent polarity of 
certain relevant contract law principles.  
5.3 Article 84 as a Possible Basis for Granting Disgorgement 
 
Although Art. 74 has gathered most of the attention from authors contemplating disgorge-
ment under the CISG,228 another option in the form of Art. 84 has been suggested to allow 
disgorgement of profits for example to a buyer who has fallen ‘victim’ to a seller’s non-
performance by way of selling the goods to a higher bidder.229  
                                                
226 Id. See also Djokhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington, Current Themes in the Law of Contract Dam-
ages: Introductory Remarks, in Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives, Hart Publish-
ing (May 2008), at 25-27. 
227 Which, arguably, are observable in the debate about the significance of good faith. 
228 See Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 20), at 90. Schmidt-Ahrendts is of the view that the only possible option for 
applying disgorgement is Art. 74. Cf. Robert A. Hillman (n 229). 
229 See generally Robert A. Hillman, Applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the  
International Sale of Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity, Cornell Review of the Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (1995) 21-49. It should be noted that even though Hillman applies 
Art. 84(2) in his line of reasoning, he argues that ultimately it is the general principles which warrant the 
application of disgorgement under the CISG. 
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This solution would inevitably require a form of analogous application of Art. 84(2), since 
the provision deals with situations where the contract has been declared avoided, as the 
provision deals with restitution of benefits.230 We should bear in mind that no direct link 
exists between damages and restitution under the doctrine of the CISG. In fact, restitution 
of unjust gains is an alternative to the other remedies available to the injured party.231  The 
CISG stipulates that restitution measures become available for parties only when the con-
tract has been avoided.232 
This approach would require analogical interpretation also, since Art. 84(2) stipulates that 
the buyer’s duty in the said circumstance, as opposed to the seller’s, is as follows: “The 
buyer must account to the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the goods or 
part of them”. 
Robert Hillman has argued that the underlying principles and aims of the Convention, 
such as encouraging to the completion of contracts, the promotion of trust and coopera-
tion, supporting planning, and reducing transaction costs, should be interpreted to allow 
the analogous application of Art. 84 to the effect of allowing disgorgement of the seller’s 
profits from selling to a third party.233 
At least, we can say that based on Art. 84(2), the idea or the legal obligation of stripping 
a party from its actual profit is not entirely foreign to the CISG. Another issue I wish to 
touch upon here relates to the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 14, which is titled: 
“Interest Under Article 78 CISG”.234 Issued in 2013, this Opinion is rather recent, and 
although it deals with a different provision from the one discussed here, it manages to 
explicitly connect Art. 84 to disgorgement. The following statement is made to that effect: 
 “Two different approaches to the award of interest must be  
 distinguished: Whereas Article 84 has a restitutionary character and 
                                                
230 Article 81(2) CISG stipulates the general applicability of restitution after avoidance of contract. 
231 CISG-AC Opinion No. 9, ‘Consequences of Avoidance of the Contract’, Rapporteur: Professor Michael 
Bridge, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom. Adopted by the CISG-AC following its 
12th meeting in Tokyo, Japan on 15 November 2008, at 1.5; Ulrich Magnus, The Remedy of Avoidance of 
Contract Under CISG - General Remarks and Special Cases, 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 2005-2006, 
at 423. 
232 Art. 26, Section V CISG; Magnus (n 231), at 426. See also Christiana Fountoulakis in: Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, Schlechtriem Peter, Schwenzer Ingeborg (Eds.), Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd ed., Oxford 2010, at 1132, Art. 84 is meant to operate to restore 
parties to the economic position that they were in prior to the formation of the contract. It can be argued 
that this is so fundamentally different from disgorgement that the analogy is simply not plausible. 
233Hillman (n 229), at 36. 
234 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 14, ‘Interest under Article 78 CISG’, Rapporteur: Professor Doctor 
Yesim M. Atamer, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey. Adopted unanimously by the CISG Advisory Council 
following its 18th meeting, in Beijing, China on 21 and 22 October 2013. 
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 reflects the idea of disgorgement, Article 78 follows similar principles to 
 damages and aims at compensation.”.235 
Although it may not seem like it at the first glance, that sentence has much to unpack. 
First of all, it is duly noted that the relevant context is about paying interest pursuant to 
Art. 78 and this alone might raise objections about the following points.236 However, the 
CISG Advisory Council, which consists of highly regarded experts, would surely never 
slip out such a statement by accident.237  
What is noteworthy about the above-quoted sentence is that as opposed to suggesting that 
Art. 84 reflects the principle of unjust enrichment238 or any other more ambiguous legal 
principle, it states that the said provision reflects a distinct and quite controversial alter-
native remedy for compensatory damages. One instance of referring to ‘disgorgement’ in 
the Opinion is the following: ”Whenever disgorgement of accrued benefits is in the fore-
ground, Article 84 applies.”, which seemingly answers the question of which provision 
applies to disgorgement. 
When we combine this with the comments provided in the CISG Advisory Council Opin-
ion No. 10, which, in turn, recognizes the ‘paradigm shift’ in the law of damages towards 
emphasizing the role of damages in protecting party’s “interest in the performance of the 
contractual obligations owed”,239 it might not be unreasonable to wonder whether or not 
this implies that the views regarding the applicability of disgorgement under the CISG 
are in a flux. 
Taking into consideration that disgorgement was not discussed during the drafting pro-
cess of the CISG, it is highly notable for a group of experts to agree that certain provision 
of the Convention reflects the idea of disgorgement. Could it be that while Art. 74 reflects 
the principle of full compensation, Art. 84, in turn, could provide a safety valve for the 
                                                
235 Id., at para 2. (emphasis added). 
236 Incidentally, the issue of paying interest under the CISG was also discussed in the context and ultimately 
resolved through analogous application. 
237 Ingeborg Schwenzer was the Chair of the Advisory Council which issued this particular opinion (No. 
14). It is also noteworthy that the Opinion uses the term ’disgorgement’ several times, leaving no doubt 
about the deliberateness of choosing the term. 
238 Cf. Phanesh Koneru, ‘The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods: An approach based on General Principles’, 6 Minn. J. Global Trade 105 (1997), at 
127; Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Article 7 in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Commentary on the 
UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), (3rd ed. Oxford University Press 2010), at 139. 
239 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 10, Agreed Sums Payable upon Breach of an Obligation in CISG 
Contracts, Rapporteur: Dr. Pascal Hachem, Bär & Karrer AG, Zurich, Switzerland. Adopted by the CISG-
AC following its 16th meeting in Wellington, New Zealand on 3 August 2012, at cmt. 4.3.4. The Opinion 
also makes a reference to the Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (H.L.), a famous common law 
disgorgement precedent.  
51 
 
execution of performance principle? Interestingly, this solution would fall along similar 
lines with the above-explained dynamics of the R3RUE, which at its core deals with res-
titution, but was supplemented with disgorgement as an ‘exception clause’ for unusual 
cases. 
As the idea of granting disgorgement by applying Art. 84 has been floated far before the 
publication of the Opinion No. 14, the council members had to be aware of the existence 
of this line of reasoning. This also lessens the credibility of any suggestion that the men-
tioning of disgorgement in connection with Art. 84 bears no significance. 
At this point, the above-examination on the part of individual remedial provisions of the 
CISG is sufficient to proceed to address principles guiding the interpretation of the CISG 




6. Interpretation of the CISG Regarding Disgorgement  
 
To introduce the interpretative framework of the CISG, we must turn to Art. 7, which sets 
out the guiding principles for the interpretation of the Convention. After explaining the 
article generally, this thesis will proceed to deal specifically with the general principles 
referred to therein. 
6.1 Article 7 CISG 
 
As stated, the CISG contains a specific provision that is meant to guide the interpreter of 
the Convention at his or her task. This provision, namely Art. 7 has been described as one 
of the most important of the Convention.240 Art. 7(1) of the CISG stipulates that:  
 In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its  
 international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
 application and the observance of good faith in international trade.241 
We are able to observe that the Convention places three separate principles at the forefront 
of its interpretation doctrine: recognition of the law’s international character, a uniform 
application as a goal and promotion of the observance of good faith in international 
trade. The wording of Art. 7(1) makes it clear that it is applicable only to the interpretation 
of the CISG, and not to the contract of the parties. However, this view has been contested 
with regard to the good faith principle, as there are existing views that advocate for the 
principle having a direct impact on the parties in the form of some requirements.242 
The ‘international character’ essentially enshrines the principle of autonomous interpre-
tation, whereby the text of the Convention must be read without any domestic preconcep-
tions. Taking into consideration the nature of the CISG as representing a transnationally 
negotiated compromise between different legal traditions, it has been advised that ‘great 
caution’ needs to be utilized in its interpretation.243 
                                                
240 Koneru (n 238), at 106. 
241 Art. 7(1) CISG. 
242 Schwenzer and Hachem (n 238), at 122. Cf. Michael Joachim Bonell, C.M. Bianca and M.J. Bonell 
(eds.), Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Giuffrè, Milan, 
1987, 65-94, at 84-85; Arthur Rosett, ‘Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods’, Vol 45 Ohio State Law Journal 1984, at para 3; Franco Ferrari, ‘Uni-
form Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law’, 24 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 1994-95, at  215; Anna Kazimierska, The Remedy of Avoidance under the Vienna Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods, Kluwer 1999-2000, at 169-171; Koneru (n 238), at 107. 
243 Schwenzer and Hachem (n 238), at 123. Cf. Ferrari (n 242), at 202, respectively argues that this principle 
should not translate to a narrow interpretation of the CISG; Greene, Stephanie M. and DiMatteo, Larry A. 
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The need to promote uniformity, in turn, means that regard should be had to foreign court 
decisions and arbitral awards when interpreting the CISG.244 These international decisions 
may have, if well-reasoned, persuasive authority and should subsequently be followed by 
other courts and tribunals. This attention to past decisions must be understood as an eval-
uation focused on specific problems arising from a given provision that is being inter-
preted.245  
The third interpretation principle of Art. 7(1), the good faith principle, has undoubtedly 
been the most discussed one, as its significance and practical usage has been debated. 
This question and its possible effect on the interpretation regarding disgorgement will be 
addressed separately in the subchapter below, which deals with the general principles 
within the interpretation of the Convention.  
Tentatively, the main issues as regards to the good faith principle under the CISG are: 1) 
its scope - in that whether it applies only to the text of the CISG and excludes the parties’ 
contractual relationship and actions, or if it has a limited effect in the evaluation of the 
latter as well, 2) the difficulty to assign an accurately determined standard of ‘good faith 
in international trade’, and 3) whether or not a requirement to observe good faith in inter-
national trade could, in conjunction with Art. 7(2), have significance in the context of 
gap-filling, and if so, to what extent. In any case, it has been strongly argued that Art. 
7(1) cannot be utilized to establish additional rights or obligations outside the interpreta-
tion of specific provisions.246 
Relating to the themes of this thesis, Schwenzer and Hachem have asserted that:  
 “Comparative law as an interpretation method must be used with great 
 caution. The requirement established by Article 7(1) that solutions are to 
 be found which are acceptable in different legal systems with different 
                                                
and Dhooge, Lucien J. and Maurer, Virginia G. and Pagnattaro, Marisa Anne, The Interpretive Turn in 
International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence (October 19, 2004). North-
western Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 24, No. pp. 299-440, 2004, (hereinafter: DiMatteo 
et al.), at 315 (holds that the presumption should be that CISG provisions are to be interpreted broadly). 
244 See also Franco Ferrari, Have the Dragons of Uniform Sales Law Been Tamed? Ruminations on the 
CISG’s Autonomous Interpretation by Courts in: Andersen Camilla B., Schroeter Ulrich G. (Eds.), Sharing 
International Commercial Law across National Boundaries: Festschrift for Albert H. Kritzer on the Occa-
sion of his Eightieth Birthday, London 2008, pp. 134- 167, at 139 (where likewise ‘uniformity’ is said to 
trigger the requirement of autonomous interpretation). 
245 Schwenzer and Hachem (n 238), at 124-126. 
246 Id., at 127-128. 
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 legal traditions nevertheless requires carving out common grounds in the 
 field of international trade.”247 
Therefore, the route forward in any question requiring interpretation of the CISG should 
be to try and ‘carve out common ground’ in international level. 
6.2 Gap-filling Under the CISG 
 
This subchapter will briefly introduce the operation and dynamics of gap-filling of the 
CISG in general. Although some might argue that the question concerning disgorgement 
does not even constitute a gap that requires interpretation, the case is that, as the CISG 
governs damages and restitution, the disgorgement issue was not discussed when the Con-
vention was drafted and as the matter is not expressly settled in the CISG, there exists the 
need to evaluate this issue pursuant to the rules set out in the CISG for such questions. 
The gap-filling process under the CISG is prescribed in Art. 7(2): 
 “Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are 
 not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general 
 principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
 conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private  
 international law.” 
Reading this subsection and its rule regarding gap-filling while bearing in mind the re-
quirement of ‘autonomous interpretation’ of the Convention, it is apparent that only when 
it is established that general principles are of no use in filling a gap, is it appropriate to 
resort to domestic law. In other words, domestic rules are to be applied as an ultima ratio 
-solution, only when applicable general principles cannot be found.248 
Naturally, Art. 7(2) is applicable only when a gap exists, since whenever specific provi-
sions govern an issue, they are to be applied without the interpreter concerning him- or 
herself with the general principles.249 
                                                
247 Id., at 132. Also noting that documents such as UNIDROIT Principles and PECL ”can… only provide a 
certain indication for the development of the law and thus be of use to support arguments made in court 
decisions or arbitral awards”. Id., at 133. 
248 Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales Law: 
Some Comments on the Interplay between the Principles and the CISG, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1149 (1994-
1995), at 1159; Schwenzer and Hachem (n 238), at 134. 
249 Lucia Carvalhal Sica, Gap-filling in the CISG: May the UNIDROIT Principles Supplement the Gaps in 
the Convention?’, Nordic Journal of Commercial Law Issue 1 (2006), at 6. 
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A general issue relating to gap-filling is that, ultimately, the tool is meant to guarantee 
the operability and relevance of the Convention so that it does not become obsolete over 
time as changes inevitably occur in the field of international sales of goods. In other 
words, gap-filling is an instrument of developing the CISG by adjusting it to answer ques-
tions that were not present during the drafting of the Convention.250  
Hence, the argument which proffers that an issue such as disgorgement was not discussed 
at the time of the drafting and therefore it cannot be recognized under the CISG, simply 
does not suffice. It can still be taken as an indicator that the drafters might not have ap-
proved the particular instrument, but this is not the endpoint of any sophisticated analysis.  
However, the general principles that are used in the gap-filling necessarily also influence 
the scope of the matters that are governed by the CISG, and if there are no identifiable 
principles from which new rules could be distilled, or if the detected principles are too 
vague for inferring a new rule for a specific situation, then that issue should not be re-
garded as governed by the Convention.251 In this sense, theoretically it could be argued 
that disgorgement falls out of the scope of the Convention, but as it will be discussed 
below, there are various general principles underlying the CISG that do provide guidance 
for the interpreter on this matter. 
6.3 Analogous Application 
 
The gap-filling method of analogical application is based on the examination of CISG 
provisions in order to determine whether certain rules or solutions, found within those 
provisions, could be applied within adequately analogous contexts to resolve legislative 
gaps.252  
The method reaches its limits, however, when the rule set out in an analogous provision 
is restricted to its specific context in such manner that its extension to other circumstances 
would be arbitrary and in contradiction with the intention of the drafters or with the pur-
pose of the rule itself.253  
                                                
250 Schwenzer and Hachem (n 238), at 135. 
251 Id. 
252 John Felemegas, Introduction to text ”An International Approach to the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law”, produced in 2007 under the 
auspices of the Institute of International Commercial Law of the Pace University School of Law, edited by 
Dr. John Felemegas, at 26. 
253 Bonell (n 242), at 78. 
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Felemegas makes a clear distinction between analogical application and using general 
principles in interpretation and contends that the former represents the ‘primary’ gap-
filling tool,254 some others favor general principles as the primary method to fill a gap or 
ambiguity.255 Then there are those who suggest that: “The two levels of the interpretive 
discourse are likely to merge in most application. It is the recognition and application of 
general principles underlying specific CISG articles that make analogical reasoning a 
functional methodology.”.256 
An interesting observation regarding this issue is that as the general principles’ interpre-
tative influence apply to the entire CISG, and as they can be used to uncover implied 
principles that underlie individual provisions, these principles are to be used for guiding 
the interpretation of specific CISG provisions. This entails analogical reasoning in order 
to make sure that article-specific interpretations fit within the larger framework of the 
CISG.257  
The analogical application is generally considered as an appropriate tool for gap-filling 
in certain cases,258 and it also meets the requirement of interpreting the CISG autono-
mously, since it exclusively relies on the text of the Convention. It is worth noting that 
this method has also been applied in various cases decided under the CISG.259 Finally, 
one test for the applicability of this method has been outlined in the following manner: 
“in considering whether the case(s) expressly regulated by it and the case at hand are so 
analogous that it would be inherently unjust not to adopt the same solution for them”.260 
6.4 General Principles in Gap-filling and Interpretation 
 
This chapter will explain how the general principles influence the CISG’s interpretation 
generally. Because of disgorgement’s relative novelty in the context of the CISG and its 
                                                
254 Felemegas (n 252), at 26. 
255 See generally Bonell (n 242), at 79; Koneru (n 238). 
256 DiMatteo et al. (n 243), at 314. 
257 Id. 
258 See Gert Brandner, ‘Admissibility of Analogy in Gap-filling under the CISG’, [1999] Pace Law School 
Institute of International Commercial Law, at para 2; Jan Hellner, Gap-filling by analogy. Art. 7 of the U.N. 
Sales Convention in Its Historical Context, Studies in International Law: Festskrift til Lars Hjerner, Stock-
holm (1990), at para 2; Bonell (n 242), at 78; Enderlein & Maskow (n 219), at 58; John Felemegas, ‘The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Inter-
pretation’, Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (2001), 
at para 3-4; Dimatteo et al. (n 243), at 313; Nives Povrzenic, Interpretation and gap-filling under the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at para 4; Schwenzer and Hachem (n 
238), at 136. 
259See e.g. Supreme Court, Poland, 11 May 2007; Austria, Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court], 18 De-
cember 2002; Vienna Arbitration proceeding SCH-4318, 15 June 1994. 
260 Bonell (n 242), at 79. Cf. Ferrari (n 242), at 222. 
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nature as governed but not expressly settled by the CISG, the issue relies heavily upon 
how to interpret and apply different general principles in relation to it.  
Also, as we have been able to infer, the text of the Convention does not render much 
support for granting disgorgement, whereas some of the general principles and derivatives 
of them, to some extent, might speak in favor of allowing disgorgement under the 
CISG.261 This realization alone makes it necessary to concentrate on the operation of gen-
eral principles in the interpretation of the CISG in our analysis. 
The role of general principles must be discussed also because, irrespective of the specific 
method through which the disgorgement issue will be resolved, the general principles will 
influence the interpretation process. 
In the interpretation of the CISG, general principles operate in such a way that when a 
legal question is examined from the perspective of general principles, it means that the 
individual provisions are observed as a part of the Convention as a whole.262 By promul-
gating the importance of general principles via Art. 7, the CISG adheres to a type of ‘ho-
listic’ interpretation, in which there are underlying values (general principles) that will 
guide the reading of individual provisions. 
An arguably important reason for this sort of dynamic interpretation doctrine is the orig-
inal goal of the CISG to become a uniform and autonomously operating body of law. This 
can be inferred from both subsections of Art. 7, as ‘international character’ and uniformity 
are emphasized and as the recourse to domestic law is reserved only as a last resort.263 
Except for the ones enumerated in Art. 7(1), the Convention does not provide any list of 
the general principles. Therefore, general principles can only be found by interpreting the 
wording of CISG provisions and by examining case law and legal literature, where gen-
eral principles have been established by judges and scholars. 
It is useful to bear in mind that the general principles may also be used in further uncov-
ering of implied principles underlying specific provisions of the CISG.264 A simplistic 
example of this in relation to disgorgement would be as follows: by interpreting Art. 84 
in light of the principles that arguably flow from the good faith principle, Art. 84 could 
                                                
261 See Schwenzer (n 20), at 1017. 
262 André Janssen and Sörren Clas Kiene, ’The CISG and Its General Principles’ in Janssen A and Meyer 
O (eds), CISG Methodology (Sellier European Law Publishers 2009 pp. 261 –286), at 285. 
263 See Bonell (n 242), at 75. 
264 DiMatteo et al. (n 243), at 313-314. 
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be interpreted as reflecting disgorgement (or embodying the principle that one must not 
benefit from one’s wrong) and applied to allow disgorgement. However, that interpreta-
tion, or any ‘gap-filling’ solution for that matter, cannot be in contradiction with other 
equally important general principles, which might be the case in the example above. 
It might seem that using general principles to derive additional general principles from 
individual provisions creates an endless process or chaotic system, which could be used 
to construct almost any conclusion that one wishes. However, the important boundaries 
and safeguards from such arbitrary interpretations are also present in the general princi-
ples as they eventually pose hard limits for the interpretation. Consequently, the crucial 
discussion is about what these general principles are, how much leeway they provide and 
to what extent can the interpreter deviate from one general principle to emphasize another. 
In conclusion, the best interpretative methodology is one that includes, and if needed, 
applies both methods: analogical application and the interpretative guidance of the gen-
eral principles.265 As established, both methods are, in many respects, entwined as for 
their practical usage. 
  
                                                
265 Anna Kazimierska (n 242), at 172.  
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7. General Principles of the CISG and Disgorgement 
 
This chapter’s objective is to lay out and explain the potential influence and interaction 
of different general principles, which are the most closely linked and, as such, can rea-
sonably be deemed to have the greatest impact regarding this thesis’ subject matter. The 
general principles that will be discussed in detail are the good faith principle and the prin-
ciple of full compensation. In addition, the principle of uniform application will be 
touched upon briefly. These principles shall be discussed in order to proceed to the even-
tual completion of this thesis and drawing conclusions.  
A considerable emphasis will be put on the good faith principle, as it is specifically men-
tioned as a guiding principle in Art. 7(1), and especially for its argumentative value re-
garding this thesis’ subject. This is because the said principle’s content and role under the 
CISG has been extensively debated both during and after the drafting process and because 
the arguably universal maxim of prohibiting a breaching party from benefiting from its 
wrong can be seen as flowing from the principle.  
In addition, the debate regarding good faith offers an interesting and, perhaps, a revealing 
viewpoint as it represents the CISG’s ‘international character’ as a compromise between 
different legal traditions.266 
7.1 What General Principles the CISG Entails? 
 
Before proceeding to the most crucial general principles for our purposes, I will first 
briefly introduce the framework that is composed of the different general principles. This 
should provide us with the appropriate context and emphasize the comprehensive and 
diverse nature of the doctrine.  
It must be understood that from diverse and often conflicting general principles can be 
derived a myriad of conclusions. The aim of the interpreter should, in any case, remain to 
produce as coherent of a result possible that conforms with all of the core tenets of the 
                                                
266 This particular circumstance might explain the debate regarding the inclusion of the principle that took 
place during the drafting of the CISG. It should be noted that, in some shape or form, ‘good faith or fair 
dealing’ principles exist in most prominent legal systems. See John Honnold, ‘Documentary History of the 
Uniform Law for International Sales’ (1989), at 298: "It was pointed out that such principles are expressly 
stated in many national laws and codes and that it was thus appropriate that similar provisions be found 
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contained in national laws had in some legal systems become useful regulators of commercial conduct." 
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Convention. I should point out that the following presentation of the different general 
principles is not an exhaustive one. 
Principles that are deemed as having a general nature and are manifested in Part 1 of the 
CISG are said to be: party autonomy, the promotion of observing good faith and estoppel 
(i.e. the prohibition of contradictory behavior) and the freedom of form. In Part 2, one 
can find the general principle of protection of a party’s reasonable reliance caused by the 
other party, and in Part 3, there is the principle of party equality and the CISG’s neutrality 
in that respect.267 
The general principle of upholding contracts (i.e. favor contractus) can be derived from 
the restrictive rules on avoidance of the contract (Articles 25, 49, 64). Art. 74 is perceived 
to enshrine the general principle of full compensation, whereas Art. 77 establishes a gen-
eral obligation to avoid and mitigate losses and disadvantages. The general rule that a 
party relying on certain facts must also bear the burden of proof can be held as a general 
principle as well. Art. 84, in turn, is said to establish a general principle of restricting 
unjust enrichment gained in a failed sales transaction.268 
Several scholars also point to a general principle of reasonability under the CISG.269 In 
fact, there are 38 instances where a standard of reasonableness is imposed in the provi-
sions of the CISG.270 Although arguably a vague principle, reasonability can still provide 
a type of overall measuring tool when weighing different choices that the interpreter is 
faced with. The reasonability standard is also applied to the conduct of the parties by 
virtue of several provisions of the CISG.271 
In some sense, the principle of reasonability resembles and supplements the good faith 
principle as it can be argued that reasonability, on a general level, would also require good 
faith behavior from the parties. Specifically relating to disgorgement, it could be argued 
on the basis of reasonability, that the fact alone that the claimant struggles to produce 
unquestionable proof of its loss should not automatically free the defendant from all lia-
bility.  
                                                
267 Schwenzer and Hachem (n 138), at 136-137. 
268 Id., at 138-139. 
269 Bonell (n 242), at 80-81; Brandner (n 258), at Para 2.A.2; Ferrari (n 242), at 225; DiMatteo et al. (n 243), 
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Despite the fact that many general principles were not mentioned, the examples given 
above should reflect the complexity of this doctrine. With that in mind, we can begin to 
examine the weight and guiding influence of specific general principles in relation to 
disgorgement. 
7.2 The Principle of Good Faith 
 
This subchapter elaborates on the process of including the good faith principle into the 
CISG, as well as the different interpretations of it and its application. This subchapter will 
also discuss the arguments that can be invoked in support of disgorgement and that are 
stemming from this principle. 
7.2.1 History and Content of Good Faith Under the CISG 
 
During the drafting of the CISG, the issue of good faith was debated intensively.272 The 
scope, influence, and manner of good faith’s implementation into the Convention was a 
subject of substantial division.273 The eventual outcome was that the concept of good faith 
was incorporated into the Convention but located to the provision guiding the interpreta-
tion (Art. 7) so that its influence would be restricted to the interpretation of the CISG 
itself. 
However, as time has passed since the drafting of the CISG, there have been voices among 
scholars suggesting that good faith could also have some influence in assessing the par-
ties’ contract and behavior.274 Depending on whom one asks, this phenomenon reflects 
either growing or creeping influence of good faith in the interpretation of the CISG. Re-
flecting this development, the good faith principle has been applied in various circum-
stances in case law, some of which might be seen as stepping outside of the confines of 
purely interpretative usage (or as neglecting the principle of uniformity).275 
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As established, the CISG does not include a freestanding obligation to act in good faith.276 
Article 7(1) is not generally regarded as requiring the parties to act in good faith. It simply 
inserts the doctrine of good faith to the interpretation dynamic of the CISG, but arguably 
not in the legal relationship between parties.277 The drafting history and the text of the 
CISG are said to reflect this view: “general duty to observe good faith and fair dealing 
was explicitly not included in the CISG as agreement could not be reached”.278 It has also 
been argued that this kind of obligation was not set because it could have created confu-
sion and undermined the CISG’s objective of harmonization of law as the different do-
mestic standards might have led to uncertainty.279 
Some have noted that rulings which have deviated from this dynamic, resulting in im-
porting a substantive obligation of good faith, usually reflect a ‘homeward trend’.280 The 
homeward trend can be described as the interpreter’s tendency to project aspects of the 
domestic law of the interpreter onto the provisions of the Convention.281 Such decisions 
could also threaten the uniform and autonomous interpretation of the CISG.282 In addition, 
it should be noted that applying domestic preconceptions to interpret the CISG is contrary 
to the autonomous application of the Convention.283 Thus, one should be cautious in ex-
amining any domestic case law, such as the Blake case, for example, when interpreting 
the CISG. 
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One possible source that should be addressed briefly is the UNIDROIT Principles, of 
which it has been stated that they may not fill gaps in the CISG unless ‘the relevant pro-
visions…are the expression of a general principle underlying CISG’.284 It has been argued 
that because the UNIDROIT Principles have deviated from the CISG in supporting an 
explicit obligation of good faith, it would be questionable to use them to inform the con-
tent of the CISG on this issue.285 
But even if a positive obligation of good faith existed under the CISG or would come to 
exist in the future, it is needless to say that this alone would not translate to disgorgement 
of profits for breach of contract. Rather, it could still be argued that the party who created 
the benefits, for example, through a second sale by breaching the contract, should be made 
to fairly allocate those profits.286 
However, the question of whether or not the principle should be applicable to the rela-
tionship of the parties is of a limited relevance in the respect of this thesis because there 
is no uncertainty about its potential applicability in possible gap-filling and analogical 
application processes.287 
The fact that the good faith principle cannot create additional rights or obligations for the 
parties,288 might satisfy some to conclude that, consequently, disgorgement cannot be al-
lowed under the CISG for its nature as a ‘new’ remedy regarding the application of the 
Convention hitherto. However, the issue is more complicated than that and requires more 
delicate scrutiny. If disgorgement could emerge under the CISG, it is granted that this 
could not flow from the principle of good faith alone. Rather, the guiding influence of the 
principle might allow a CISG provision or another to be applied to that effect. The imme-
diate question relating to this is whether or not the provision applied to that effect would 
transform beyond recognition in the process. In this case, such a solution should be re-
jected. 
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A persistent problem with the good faith principle, which is also consequently a cause of 
the denial of the principle’s significance, has been and will continue to be the difficulty 
to accurately define the principle into having a particular meaning. This, of course, is not 
obtainable as the nature of the concept is inherently abstract and relative. However, there 
are specific principles that can be regarded to some extent as derivatives of the good faith 
principle that can be more precisely determined and applicable in practice. These will be 
discussed below in a separate subchapter.  
Although an elusive term, good faith should not be considered as impossible to define. 
Paul Powers has proposed a working definition of good faith, that is, “international in 
character and captures the essence of various domestic definitions”:  
 “The duty of good faith can be defined as an expectation and obligation to 
 act honestly and fairly in the performance of one's contractual duties. A 
 certain amount of reasonableness is expected from the contracting  
 parties.”.289 
While recognizing the fact that this definition refers to good faith as a duty and moder-
ately extends its applicability to contracting parties as opposed to keeping the principle’s 
function solely attached to interpretation, it nevertheless offers a tangible and more com-
prehensive perspective for the interpretative viewpoint as well. 
7.2.2 The Divide Between Civil- and Common Law Perceptions of Good Faith 
 
Powers explains that there is a distinction between civil- and common law regarding the 
concept of good faith. According to Powers, “civil law states tend to use a more expansive 
approach to the good faith obligation, applying it to both contract formation and perfor-
mance”, whereas “common law states prefer a [narrower] good faith duty applicable to 
contract performance”.290  
For the most part, these differences of approach on a global scale led to the debate about 
good faith at the drafting of the Convention. Consequently, a working group was consti-
tuted and it proposed a compromise that would protect the Convention’s international 
character while promoting uniformity and good faith as well.291 This compromise, like 
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the CISG as a whole, was ultimately aimed to suit both civil- and common law doctrines 
so the solution would be acceptable in different legal systems.292  
Another consequence of this compromise regarding the remedial doctrine of the CISG 
was that the Convention accommodates both the right to claim specific performance 
(more widely available in civil law systems) and the right to claim monetary damages 
(favored in common law systems).293 These remedies are offered to the aggrieved party 
without attaching priority to either one over the other.294 
To summarize: the important commonality between the two most prominent legal tradi-
tions of the modern world regarding the concept of good faith is that the principle is gen-
erally seen as requiring honesty and reasonableness in the contract performance to which 
a party has bounded itself.295 In this sense, it could be argued that the controversy of in-
terpreting good faith in similar fashion under the CISG might have been exaggerated out 
of proportion. Another important notion regarding this thesis is the apparent connection 
of this definition of good faith and disgorgement in that also the latter is conventionally 
seen as requiring honesty and fairness in the contract performance. 
When examining the definitions of good faith in the UCC and the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, in different civil law systems, in the UNIDROIT Principles and even in the 
context of the CISG, it is observable that, while the definitions might vary, the same un-
derlying idea is present: at minimum, contracting parties must act in some manner of good 
faith in their contract performance.296  
An intriguing phenomenon relating to this issue is that in the U.S, which is a common 
law country where good faith is traditionally conceived more restrictedly as is the right 
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to specific performance, steps have been taken towards more distinct recognition of dis-
gorgement as has been referenced above. At some level, this would seem counterintuitive, 
but perhaps it serves as an example of the constantly developing character of the prece-
dent-driven legal tradition the U.S is part of. One apparent reason for the above-described 
developments in the U.S, especially observable in the R3RUE, could be the common 
law’s persistent rejection of penalty clauses in contract law.297 
7.2.3 More Tangible Derivatives of Good Faith Principle 
 
In addition to good faith being explicitly mentioned as a general principle of the Conven-
tion and specific provisions exemplifying the good faith principle, such as provisions 
dealing with preservation of goods and mitigation of damages,298 it can be argued that 
certain maxims in contract law are inherently connected with this principle.  
One such maxim is that a party should not benefit from breaching its duty to perform. As 
good faith can be defined by what it is not, and while the concept of bad faith is not 
necessarily an integral part of the analysis, it can be relied upon to highlight what is def-
initely not a good faith performance.299 Thus, there is a strong argument that if good faith 
is to be taken seriously as an underlying principle of the CISG, consciously benefiting by 
breaching one’s obligation should be prohibited and to the extent possible, subsequently 
deterred.  
In relation to this, pacta sunt servanda, which is an age old legal principle, can either be 
seen as representing this same idea, but only on a more general level or it can be under-
stood as a separate principle supporting the above-described maxim. In any case, the pro-
found ideas that contracts should be honored and that the innate character of contracts as 
binding renders some verification to the concept of disgorgement. After all, when pacta 
sunt servanda demands performance in circumstances in which the act of performing has 
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become onerous to the extent of causing loss,300 it should evidently demand performance 
in circumstances where a party could achieve higher profits by breaching. 
By virtue of this principle, once a contract has been concluded, the parties are expected 
to fulfill their obligations. From this point of view, the breaching party is not granted the 
‘Holmesian’ option of either paying damages or performing. Rather, in civil law, this 
option is given to the injured party as he or she can also demand specific performance.301 
7.2.4 The Principle of Good Faith and Disgorgement 
 
It is evident that the principle of good faith and fair dealing enshrined in Art. 7(1) can be 
evoked in support of a claim for disgorgement of profits. It is also clear that the said 
principle should be applied with caution, as we have gathered that it cannot bring about 
entirely novel rights and obligations under the Convention. Instead, the principle influ-
ences the existing content of the CISG. 
Should disgorgement emerge in the future, it would not flow directly from the good faith 
principle, but probably through a broader conception of full compensation interpreted 
with regard to the demands set by the good faith principle. As remedies exist, to a large 
extent, to protect what the parties bargained for i.e. the performance of the contract and 
as they should also reflect the aim to promote a trust-based system, the argument in sup-
port of disgorgement, based on the principle of good faith, should be considered seriously 
and meticulously.  
In conclusion, there are powerful arguments for allowing a claim for disgorgement under 
the CISG. However, the potential deterrence-effect of disgorgement as well as other de-
sirable impacts must be regarded in the framework that consists of all general principles 
of the Convention. Thus, I will next examine the principle of full compensation before 
drawing the final conclusions of this thesis. 
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7.3 The Principle of Full Compensation 
 
The principle of full compensation underlying Art. 74 CISG has been already introduced 
in the chapter dealing with remedial provisions of the CISG. Therefore, this subchapter 
will deal with the said principle specifically in relation to disgorgement. 
The full compensation principle is well established and its core content, which is in plac-
ing the injured party in the same economic position in which it would have been if the 
contract had been performed, is applied in various legal systems around the world. Simply 
put: the principle is meant to provide full compensation to the aggrieved party for all 
losses resulting from breach of contract. 
Although, the text of Art. 74 clearly stipulates that damages consist of a sum equal to the 
loss, and while the full compensation principle undoubtedly is based on this specific stip-
ulation, it should be seen as the general rule regarding damages instead of barring further 
interpretations of different provisions or placing rigid hard limits thereof. The interpreta-
tive influence of the principle should necessarily deviate from a strict rule of black letter 
text as that is essentially how all principles operate: to be encompassingly and pervasively 
applicable, a certain degree of abstraction is required. 
The main issue concerning the principle of full compensation and disgorgement is natu-
rally the implicit effect of prohibiting overcompensation as full compensation reaches its 
limits when the actual loss is compensated. This limitation is behind the unavailability of 
punitive damages under the CISG. There exists a consensus that because punitive dam-
ages aim at the punishment for outrageous behavior instead of compensation, they may 
not be awarded under Art. 74 CISG.302  
Disgorgement, for its part, is often depicted as being based on a punitive rationale.303 
Occasionally, the remedy is described as ‘supra-compensatory’, for its partial independ-
ency from provable, actual loss of the injured party.304 Thus, the idea that disgorgement 
is incompatible with the principle of full compensation can be easily understood.305  
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One perspective that should not be overlooked when analyzing this line of reasoning is 
the appropriate differentiation between the core tenet of the full compensation principle 
i.e. total reparation and the prohibition of overcompensation as a derivative rule. It should 
be acknowledged that the principal character of full compensation is the purpose of guar-
anteeing the injured party’s right to receive compensation for all losses. And indeed, even 
in legal systems which allow punitive damages, the general concept of contract damages 
is based on the concept of full compensation.306 
However, this is not to imply that the CISG would not contain the prohibition of punitive 
damages. I argue that the effect of disallowing ‘overcompensation’ is, while a logical 
corollary, still a derivative in relation to the core objective of the full compensation prin-
ciple. 
It seems that this derivative nature is also observable in the previously referenced opin-
ions of Schwenzer, who posits that as the aggrieved party is already disadvantaged from 
the outset, punitive elements have to be included to guarantee full compensation of the 
aggrieved party307 and that “penal elements can also play a role despite the fact that the 
Convention does not allow awarding punitive damages”.308 
Should one adopt the categorical viewpoint that ‘punitive’ as a term and qualification 
accompanies any remedy that deviates from the strict requirement for equivalence be-
tween loss and compensation, then one would perceive disgorgement as punitive. How-
ever, this view seems unnecessary rigid when compared, for example, to the rule that the 
amount of loss needs to be proven only with reasonable certainty, which necessarily 
leaves leeway regarding the said equivalence. The argument that disgorgement represents 
a form of punitive damages, and as they are prohibited under the Convention, it is the end 
of the story, is not adequately complex of an analysis. 
Generally, the principle protects the aggrieved party’s right to be compensated for all 
disadvantages suffered as a result of a breach of contract.309 However, as we know, the 
specifics of the principle are not that simple. ‘All disadvantages’ can be understood to 
entail a myriad of different things. Without an in-depth analysis of how the expectation 
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of a party is construed, it is widely recognized that there are, for example, many forms of 
harm that do not easily translate into economic terms. 
The Advisory Council’s Opinion No. 6 states that Art. 74 CISG does not allow for awards 
that result in the promisee being in a better position than it would have been had the 
contract been performed.310 There are factors, however, that may lead to the factual under-
compensation of the injured party. The reality of quantifying the amount of all the disad-
vantages caused to the injured party is seldom as straightforward as in theory. Difficulties 
imposed in the practical process, as well as the legal restraints set out for damages, may 
lead to compensation being less than ‘full’.311 
It can be argued that the application of a strict approach regarding the principle is not 
entirely supported under the CISG. Indeed, certain disadvantages that are not visible on 
the balance sheet should be deemed recoverable.312 For reference, the PICC 2010 and 
PECL mention non-pecuniary damage as compensable.313 
Therefore, I would regard the strict prohibition of overcompensation, to some extent, as 
a question open to interpretation. This is also due to the interpretative framework of the 
Convention that is based on numerous general principles and the consequent notion that 
the principles of good faith and pacta sunt servanda should also be considered when in-
terpreting the CISG. As has been previously explained, disgorgement is not punitive per 
se,314 but intends to demotivate a party from breaching by introducing the possibility that 
the breach might be futile (instead of punishable) in a business sense. The uncertain pro-
portion of ‘overcompensation’ could be regarded as an unintended and secondary by-
product of the remedy.  
I would argue, for example, that granting disgorgement would not be contradictory as 
regards the full compensation principle in circumstances where the risk of the achieved 
profit actually being higher than the loss is only relatively small. Some might argue that 
this would only represent a quantification method for damages rather than disgorgement, 
but to some extent, this example should suggest that the prohibition of overcompensation 
is not absolute.  
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Nevertheless, the opposing view should not be omitted either: it can be argued that the 
right to claim compensatory damages is a sufficient, as well as exhaustive, expression of 
pacta sunt servanda under the CISG and, thus, any additional remedies, such as disgorge-
ment, are not required.  
7.4 Uniformity of Application 
 
One important general principle still to be addressed in this analysis is one of the three 
explicitly mentioned in Art. 7(1), namely the principle of uniform application of the 
CISG. 
As established, the need to promote uniformity in the application of the CISG translates 
into the practice of having regard for foreign courts decisions and arbitral awards where 
the CISG has been applied. Previous rulings and the reasonings they contain may have 
persuasive authority. In this case, they should be followed by subsequent interpreters. 
This reference to previous rulings should be understood “as evaluating foreign decisions 
and arbitral awards when it comes to specific problems arising from the provision to be 
interpreted.”.315 
To some extent, this principle could eventually go both ways with regard to disgorgement. 
On one hand (and axiomatically), the decision in the Adras case has been criticized on 
the basis of it endangering the uniformity of the international sales law,316 but on the other 
hand, there might be a tipping point in the development of different domestic laws re-
garding disgorgement, after which the uniformity of the CISG might be jeopardized by 
way of courts resorting to domestic laws instead of trying to find appropriate solution 
within the CISG.317 
However, due to the fact that there are very few precedents with persuasive authority 
allowing disgorgement of profits under the Convention, the uniformity of application 
should be viewed as tilting towards more conservative and, subsequently, restrictive in-
terpretation in this matter. The interpreters of the CISG will likely be cautious in their 
conclusions as regards granting any form of disgorgement, as there exists only limited 
support for resolving a ‘hard case’ in favor of disgorgement, arguably even when the 
circumstances at hand would render such considerations relevant and appropriate.  
                                                
315 Schwenzer and Hachem (n 238), at 124-126. 
316 Adar Yehuda, ‘Israel’, in: DiMatteo Larry A. (editor), International Sales Law, A Global Challenge, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 2014, 518–538, at 523; Reich (n 81); Schlechtriem (n 82), at 11. 
317 See Schwenzer and Hachem (n 238), at 95. Cf. Felemegas (n 258), at chapter 3. 
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This presumption was defied by an arbitration case in 2007 which was decided by apply-
ing the CISG and administered by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The breaching 
party’s profits (the amount of the buyer’s sales from a two-year period) were ordered to 
be handed over to the aggrieved party as a form of compensation.318 An interesting aspect 
regarding this case is that, to a large extent, the award was influenced by the fact that the 
breach was that of a confidentiality clause and the breach also involved exploitation of 
protected information of the aggrieved party in the form of IT-source code.319  
These aspects also merge rather distinctly with some of the considerations that have been 
put forth elsewhere within the discourse regarding disgorgement. Also, in a world in 
which different forms of information are ever more valuable but simultaneously difficult 
to put a price on in varying contexts, the questions as to quantification of appropriate 
compensation might begin to coalesce with the straightforward and arguably fair method 
of quantification provided by disgorgement. 
It would seem that the award was made with significantly more interest over the question 
of what the breaching party gained from the breach rather than what the actual loss in that 
case was. It remains questionable whether the final award actually equaled with the loss 
of the injured party. Then again, perhaps compensatory damages would have been inad-
equate from the perspective of the injured party. In any case, the award serves as an ex-
ample of how varying cases are decided under the CISG. I would rather invoke this case 
in calling for a broader discussion about this issue instead of attaching excessive authority 
to it. 
  
                                                
318 Pressure sensors case (Stochholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration), 5 April 2007. 
319 Id., at paras 147-168, 170-174. Also in the Blake case, there was a breach of ‘restrictive covenant’ and 





To begin with the final remarks of this thesis, I would point out that the so-called legal 
environment from which the R3RUE arose had much in common with the different doc-
trines of the CISG. If disgorgement should become feasible under the CISG, I argue that 
it would require a further and more principled reading of Art. 84. This could grant it a 
distinctly recognized feature as embodying a general principle favoring disgorgement. As 
noted above, there might already be some signs of this happening.  
As we recall, the disgorgement rule of the R3RUE stems jointly from doctrines of resti-
tution and damages. Now, as Art. 84’s reading seems to have evolved from constituting 
the general principle of unjust enrichment to ‘reflecting the idea of disgorgement’, it 
might not be wholly unreasonable to consider the prospect of the CISG adopting or tol-
erating some of the ideas manifested in the R3RUE as time goes by. As regards the CISG, 
possible changes in the interpretation of the relevant provisions and principles might also 
be contingent on further developments of different domestic legal systems, of which there 
are already examples at this point, the U.S put aside.320  
As for the R3RUE, it remains to be seen, whether it signals a genuinely significant devel-
opment within American contract law, and much will rely on the large-scale reception of 
the updated Restatement by the U.S. courts. But in any case, this recent development 
regarding more established and explicit support for disgorgement in the U.S. should not 
be disregarded. The changes may not be rapid or even conclusive, but, perhaps, they 
should persuade the international sales law community to take another look at the CISG 
in the light that is cast by the developments in the R3RUE.  
As a contingent notion, the principle regarding damages as essentially aiming at compen-
sation by virtue of Art. 74 should, nevertheless, affect the possible application of dis-
gorgement so that it would only be available when the conventional remedy of compen-
sating the calculable loss of the injured party fails to provide adequate protection for his 
or her performance interest. This would also be in line with the reasoning in the R3RUE. 
The reality is that the requirement for uniform application of the CISG makes it difficult 
for a single court or tribunal to draw the conclusions that would have to be drawn in order 
to establish a precedent in regard of disgorgement. And rightly so. In addition, the cases 
                                                
320 Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 20), at 96; Israel & O’Neill (n 194), at 6; Arts. 6:78, 6:104 Dutch Civil Code. 
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where there would be reasonable grounds for even making a claim for disgorgement are 
in all likelihood in short supply. 
I would argue that the best way forward would be a specific CISG Advisory Council 
Opinion, that, if drafted in a balanced manner, could lend restricted or conditional support 
for granting disgorgement in certain exceptional cases. Even if such support would be 
seen as unattainable or unwarranted, the Advisory Council could at least clarify the most 
paramount issues to consider in cases in which compensatory damages appear to be inad-
equate.  
At this point, the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6 has taken the stance that over-
compensation must be avoided when awarding damages. This also supports the view that 
for disgorgement to be awarded under the CISG, it would require further interpretation 
or analogical application of Art. 84 or certain general principle therein. It should be noted 
that the Advisory Council’s Opinion No. 6 specifically and exclusively analyzed the ap-
propriate interpretation and quantification of damages and, quite understandably, did not 
attempt to provide an encompassing interpretation of the entire remedial doctrine or ad-
dress the disgorgement issue explicitly.  
Recourse to the domestic law being an ultima ratio measure within the doctrine of the 
CISG should also push the authorities of the Convention into pursuing an articulated and 
more convincing conclusion on this matter. After all, the relief valve of Art. 7(2) should 
not be interpreted as an easy path around the challenging task to determine the correct 
interpretation of the text and the general principles of the CISG. 
As regards the question of good faith in international trade, the U.S. is the only common 
law country that has included good faith into its statutory regime.321 Section 1-203 of the 
UCC states that “Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement.”.322 From this perspective, it is worth noting that 
the U.S, in particular, has forwarded the above-described developments regarding dis-
gorgement. 
In passing, it is also noteworthy that the new Contract Law of the People’s Republic of 
China has likewise included the principle of good faith into several articles. Article 6, 
                                                
321 Bruno Zeller, ‘Good Faith - Is it a Contractual Obligation?’, Bond Law Review Vol 15, Issue 2 (2003) 
215-239, at 215. 
322 This was reinforced in section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts (Second), where a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing was also imposed on the parties in contract performance and enforcement. 
75 
 
referred to as the most important one, reads: “The parties shall abide by the principle of 
honesty and good faith in exercising their rights and performing their obligations.”.323 
What is remarkable in the theory/remedy of disgorgement is that it boldly and markedly 
challenges the good faith principle to its core. It electrifies the debate around the content, 
usage, and utility of the principle as the idea of disgorgement can be seen as creating a 
type of litmus-test in posing the question of whether a principle intended to promote hon-
esty, trust, protection of reasonable expectations and co-operation can be simply put aside 
in order to uphold a certain long-standing rule. 
Despite these considerations, an honest recognition of disgorgement’s nature as an outlier 
is in place. However, it is often the case that the outliers or ‘hard cases’ provide the most 
fruitful viewpoint through which the weighing of different legal principles can occur. 
Finally, should an interpretation prevail that under the CISG, disgorgement of profits is 
simply not feasible as regards to the full compensation principle, I am confident that all 
interested parties would welcome a more comprehensive analysis of the general princi-
ples arriving at such a conclusion.  
As a final remark, I would entertain a possible compromise solution of allowing courts to 
use their discretion on this matter in a similar fashion as they are able to do with specific 
performance. Specific performance, like disgorgement, is a remedy that might be consid-
ered appropriate in some legal systems but not in others. The fact that the Convention 
allows specific performance has not caused significant problems or friction among dif-
ferent member states. Arguably, one reason for this is the limitation of Art. 28, according 
to which a court is not bound to order specific performance unless the court would do so 
under its own law.  
Analogical application of this provision to disgorgement would naturally require, in the 
first place, the conclusion that in some cases disgorgement could be awarded under the 
Convention. Specific performance was and is viewed quite differently among the signa-
tory states. It was debated at the time of drafting the CISG,324 and the outcome was that 
the remedy shall be subjected to a discretionary review of a court as to whether a specific 
relief would be granted under the court’s domestic law.  
                                                
323 Zeller (n 321), at 216; Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, Chapter I, Article 6. 
324 See generally Walt (n 301). 
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Should disgorgement be allowed in some limited set of circumstances, given the above-
discussed connections and similarities between specific performance and disgorgement 
awards, for example, as regards specific interest in unique goods or other circumstances 
that might render monetary damages insufficient,325 the limitation of Art. 28 might serve 
to restrict the above-mentioned ‘sweeping implications’.326 
In summary, this thesis’ aim was to draw necessary attention to certain national tenden-
cies and universal legal theories relating to wider acceptance of disgorgement of profits 
in contract law. The writer’s contention is that based on the general principles of the CISG 
the possible applicability of disgorgement as an ultima ratio remedy should not be ruled 
out categorically. However, such application should necessitate further recognition of 
Art. 84 as enabling this function, and possibly an analogous limitation to that of Art. 28. 
                                                
325 Cunnington identifies five situations regarding specific performance: Cases where there is no market 
substitute, cases where damages are too difficult to quantify, cases where the breaching party will not be 
able to pay damages, cases where only nominal damages are available and cases where the type of loss is 
not recoverable, Ralp Cunnington ‘The Inadequacy of Damages as a Remedy for Breach of Contract’ in 
Charles EF Rickett Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) at 115. 
326 Roberts (n 17), at 142. 
